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I. INTRODUCTION

Plea bargaining now dominates the day-to-day operation of the
American criminal justice system; about ninety-five percent of
convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea. 1 Indeed, despite
the strenuous objections of prominent academic commentators, 2 plea
bargaining seems to be growing only more entrenched over time. 3
Increasingly, scholars are turning their attention from abolition to
reform, seeking ways to improve an institution that seems unlikely
to disappear any time soon. 4 In particular, recent reform proposals
have focused on problems of accuracy and desert, attempting to
address concerns that plea bargaining systematically results in

1

See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN
LARGE URBAN CQUNTIES, 2002, at 28 (2006) ("[In felony cases filed in May 2002 in the nation's
seventy-five largest counties g]uilty pleas accounted for 95% of the estimated 31,772
convictions obtained within 1 year of arrest ...."); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2002, at 11 (2005) [hereinafter FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING] (showing that in year ending September 30, 2002, 69,072 of
total 71,798 federal convictions (or 96.2%) were obtained by plea). Overall, taking into
account other outcomes besides conviction, about two-thirds of felony cases in state court in
large urban counties and about eighty-six percent of all federal criminal cases are resolved
by way of a guilty plea. See FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, supra, at 25
("[N]early two-thirds of defendants entered a guilty plea at some point .... "); FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra, at 11 (showing that 69,072 out of 80,424 total federal
defendants were convicted by way of guilty plea).
2
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983) ("Even a
cursory listing of objections to this practice may consume several paragraphs."); John H.
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12-13 (1978) (comparing
coercive effects of plea bargaining to medieval torture); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining As Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992)("[P]lea bargaining seriously impairs
the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of the guilty
from the innocent.").
3
See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 718 (2006) (describing "well-entrenched" position of
plea bargaining); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91 (2005) (depicting pronounced upward trend in
guilty plea rates in federal system since 1981).
4
See, e.g., Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal
Litigation, 47 UCLAL. REV. 113, 115-17 (1999) (rejecting absolutist positions on negotiability
of criminal procedure rights in plea bargaining and proposing "middle ground" inquiry);
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2145 ( 1998)(characterizing plea bargaining system as "largely acceptable," but not
"incapable of improvement"); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1121, 1123, 1126-27 (1998)("accept[ing] plea bargaining as a given" and arguing for
adoption by prosecutorial offices of clear "plea-bargaining theory").
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conviction of the innocent, or otherwise imposes punishment that is
unjustifiably harsh or lenient. 5 While such considerations of
distributive justice are plainly compelling, this Article argues that
procedural justice also ought to be part of the plea bargaining
reform agenda. An exclusive focus on the outcomes of plea
bargaining misses the important contributions that process
potentially makes to the acceptance of outcomes and the perceived
legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
What would a procedurally just plea bargaining system look like?
In answering this question, I focus particularly on the process by
which prosecutors develop, present, and respond to proposed plea
agreements, and I draw on a well-established body of social
psychology research that has, until recently, largely escaped the
attention of criminal law scholars. This research has identified
5
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L.
& ECON. 353, 355-56 (2006) (proposing reforms to reduce risk of convicting innocent);
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow ofTrial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2468
(2004) ("Rather than basing sentences on the need for deterrence, retribution, incapacitation,
or rehabilitation, plea bargaining effectively bases sentences in part on wealth, sex, age,
education, intelligence, and confidence."); Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75
TUL. L. REv. 695, 759 (2001) (arguing that "ad hoc" plea bargains should be regulated because,
inter alia, they "may bear little or no relationship to the charged offense or penological goals");
Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 600 (1997) (arguing for full implementation of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice in order to prevent wrongful convictions in plea bargaining); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial
Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2299 (2006) (arguing for partial ban on plea
bargaining in order to reduce risk of wrongful convictions); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight
ofNegotiated Sentences in a World ofBargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 308 (2005)
("Oversight of negotiated sentences by judges provides some assurance that bargains do not
deviate too far, or too often, from legislated limits on punishment."); Susan R. Klein,
Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 2023, 2028 (2006) ("To ensure accuracy and equality [in plea negotiations], federal
criminal defendants and jurists need the information necessary to determine whether a
prosecutor could prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, and the data regarding
charges imposed and sentences levied against suspects alleged to have engaged in similar
conduct."); Michael M. O'Hear, The End o{Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of Apprendi
to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 880 (2006) (arguing that coercive force of
charging threats increases risk of wrongful convictions); Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity
Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1549 (2006) (arguing for
giving defendants right to bench trial to "divest the prosecution of its power to force
defendants into harsh and inefficient plea bargains"); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial
Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 200 (2006)
(arguing that greater judicial involvement in plea bargaining"can render the final disposition
more accurate"); Wright, supra note 3, at 86 (arguing for sentencing reforms that would
improve accuracy of plea bargaining system).
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several factors that contribute to perceptions of procedural justice,
including whether the people involved have opportunities to tell
their sides of the story (that is, whether they have "voice"), whether
the authorities act in a manner that indicates neutrality and
trustworthiness, and whether those involved are treated with
dignity and respect. 6
This Article thus offers a first effort in legal literature to apply
the social psychology model of procedural justice to the practice of
plea bargaining. Using the model, I contend that plea bargaining
should be regarded as procedurally just to the extent that
prosecutors give defendants opportunities to tell their sides of the
story before making or responding to an offer; explain their
bargaining positions by reference to objective, uniformly applied
criteria; demonstrate consideration of arguments made by
defendants; and avoid the use of charging threats and other highpressure tactics to induce guilty pleas. 7
In practice, many prosecutors and prosecutorial offices already
embrace such procedural norms, 8 but this by no means occurs on a
uniform or systematic basis. 9 For instance, despite detailed
guidance regarding other aspects of plea bargaining, there is no
treatment of procedural justice considerations in such authoritative
statements of prosecutorial norms as the National District
Attorneys' Association's National Prosecution Standards or the

6

See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.
8
For instance, federal prosecutorial offices tend to employ relatively formal plea
bargaining procedures that, consciously or otherwise, often comport fairly well with
procedural justice norms. For a recent description of plea bargaining practices in one such
United States Attorney's Office, see Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating
Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1065-92 (2006). This is not to say, however, the federal practices are
beyond criticism. For instance, the time pressures imposed on some defendants to plead
guilty pursuant to federal "fast-track" programs raise substantial proceduraljustice concerns.
See JaneL. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox
ofEarly Disposition Programs: A Primer on "Fast-Track" Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 532
(2006) (discussing fast-track sentencing and problems with plea bargaining); see also Lynch,
supra note 4, at 2125 (describing "practices characteristic of federal white-collar criminal
investigations involvingwell-financed defendants" as "somewhat idealized version of the plea
bargaining process").
9
See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2129 (noting that plea bargaining procedures are not
codified, "but negotiated case-by-case in the context of customary practice").
7
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Department of Justice's United States Attorneys' Manual. 10 Indeed,
such disregard ofproceduraljustice by prosecutors is to be expected:
social psychology research indicates that, while decision recipients
evaluate fairness based chiefly on process, decision makers focus
largely on outcomes. 11
Though unsurprising, the neglect of procedural justice is
unfortunate. The social psychology research indicates that
implementing procedural justice norms not only may increase
defendant satisfaction with plea-bargained outcomes (even if the
outcomes themselves remain substantively unchanged), but also
may contribute to the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice
system and ultimately enhance defendants' levels of voluntary
compliance with legal rules and authorities. 12 There are, in short,
good reasons to believe that greater attentiveness by prosecutors to
procedural justice may increase the cooperativeness of defendants
while they are under criminal justice supervision and decrease their
likelihood of recidivism. 13

10

See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS' Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 190-99 (2d
ed. 1991) (discussing standards for plea negotiations); U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANuAL§§ 9-16.001-16.500, 9-27.330-27.650(2006) (setting standards for pleas).
11
See Larry Heuer, What's Just About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological
Perspective, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 209, 214--18 (2005) (reviewing decisionmaker studies).
12
See generally Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 483 (1988) (discussing research on determinants oflitigant satisfaction, effects
on procedural and distributive fairness, and implications for plea bargaining).
13
See generally Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of
Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 163 (1997) (discussing study in
which procedural justice was associated with reduced recidivism). In this Article, I focus on
how the prosecutor's conduct during plea negotiations may diminish recidivism risks.
Another promising body ofliterature explores the potential for defense counsel to contribute
to rehabilitation in the plea-bargaining setting. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 743, 753-55 (2005) (discussing potential for empathy training for defense clients); Bruce
J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and
Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence I Preventive Law Model, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 1034, 1049-51 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, defense lawyers' assistance with post-offense
rehabilitation and use of rehabilitative efforts to negotiate downward departures in
sentencing ranges). For a skeptical view of this literature, see Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to
Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar:
Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 541 (2007)
("[Professor David Wexler's] model not only runs the risk of displacing existing defense and
clinical community values, but may well conflict with ethical and legal mandates for defense
attorneys.").
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I thus propose a novel criterion by which to evaluate plea
bargaining practices, that is, whether defendants perceive the
practices to be procedurally just. This criterion supports the
implementation of reforms that are both practically feasible and
capable of making important contributions to the ability of the
criminal justice system to deliver efficient crime control.
To be clear, I do not claim here that the proposed procedural
justice norms are constitutionally or statutorily mandated (although
I have argued elsewhere that charging threats do indeed raise
serious constitutional problems 14). Nor do I claim that these norms
must always trump other objectives of the criminal justice system
(such as speedy case processing) when and if they conflict. Rather,
the point is that prosecutors should more systematically attend to
procedural justice in plea bargaining; incorporate proceduraljustice
into influential statements of prosecutorial norms, such as the
National Prosecution Standards; and consider specific changes in
office policies and practices that would bring plea bargaining into
greater conformity with the procedural justice model. 15
The Article proceeds in three parts, as follows. Part II sets forth
background on plea bargaining. Part III lays out the basic case for
procedural justice in plea bargaining. I summarize the pertinent
social psychology research and theorizing, discuss how this work
might apply in the plea bargaining context, and argue that the
effects associated with procedural justice-greater acceptance of
adverse decisions, enhanced perceptions of legitimacy, and higher
levels of voluntary compliance with the law and legal
authorities-are important and legitimate objectives of the criminal
justice system. Finally, Part IV addresses a variety of potential
objections, including, perhaps most importantly, those arising from

14

See O'Hear, supra note 5, at 840 (proposing "a new rule of constitutional law that the
[Supreme Court] should adopt if given a fresh opportunity to address the issue of
prosecutorial charging threats").
15
As Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have recently observed, the internal administration
of "justice agencies," such as prosecutorial offices, largely has been neglected by legal
scholars. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 55 (2002). This is an unfortunate tendency, as they observe, because "scholars
overlook central features of the American criminal justice system when they fail to consider
the values that agencies might seek and how they might achieve those goals through internal
rules." !d. Consonant with Wright and Miller's project, this Article might be thought of as
an effort "to consider the values [i.e., procedural justice] that agencies might seek." Id. ,
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the transaction costs of procedural justice. These objections
underscore the need for further empirical research and
experimentation, but they are not so compelling on their face as to
justify the continuing neglect of procedural justice by plea
bargaining scholars and practitioners.

II. THE PRACTICE OF PLEA BARGAINING:
CHARACTERISTICS AND PREMISES

This Part offers a brief overview of plea bargaining, suggesting
along the way circumstances that are particularly likely to give rise
to procedural justice problems. In developing a workable model of
plea bargaining, the diversity of the real world must be reduced to
manageable proportions. Thus, for simplicity's sake, I assume that
plea bargaining is a bilateral interaction between a prosecutor on
one side, and a defendant and his or her lawyer on the other,
thereby disregarding the important role that judges sometimes play
as de facto bargainers. 16 I also assume that negotiations involve a
lawyer on the defense side, thus leaving to one side those cases in
which prosecutors negotiate directly with defendants themselves. 17
Finally, I assume that a plea offer (which can be made by either
side) involves an express promise by the defendant to plead guilty
to one or more specified charges in return for either the dismissal of
other charges, a favorable sentencing recommendation by the
prosecutor or both. 18

16
See Seung-Hee Lee, The Scales ofJustice: Balancing Neutrality and Efficiency in PleaBargaining Encounters, 16 DISCOURSE & Soc'y 33, 34 (2005) (summarizing normative and
empirical literature on judge's role in plea bargaining). Note, however, that in the federal
system, as well as some state systems, judges are prohibited or discouraged from
participating in plea negotiations. See Turner, supra note 5, at 202 ("Under Federal Rule 11,
judges may not take any part in plea negotiations or even make comments that might
indirectly influence the bargaining process.").
17
This direct negotiation phenomenon is particularly important in less serious cases, in
which there may be no constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants. See
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding there is no right to appointed counsel in
cases in which fine, but not imprisonment, is imposed). Even where the constitutional right
to appointed legal counsel exists, however, it is common in some jurisdictions for defendants
to waive the right and negotiate directly with prosecutors. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HAsTINGS
L.J. 1031, 1077-78 (2005) (describing Georgia courts in which, after meeting with prosecutor,
"every defendant informs the judge that he would like to waive counsel and plead guilty").
18
I thus exclude consideration of the phenomenon that some scholars label "implicit plea
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Field studies of plea bargaining draw an important distinction
between routine case processing and more adversarial interactions. 19
In routine case processing, cases are resolved quickly, with little or
no haggling, shortly before or during a routine, preliminary court
appearance by the defendant, such as arraignment. 2° Consider, for
instance, Milton Heumann's description of practices in Connecticut
state court:
Typically, in the circuit court, a line forms outside the
prosecutor's office the morning before court is convened.
Defense attorneys shuffle into the prosecutor's office
and, in a matter of two or three minutes, dispose of the
one or more cases "set down" that day. Generally, only
a few words have to be exchanged before agreement is
reached. The defense attorney mutters something about
the defendant, the prosecutor reads the police report,

bargaining." See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CALIFORNIA 52 (1993) ("An implicit plea 'bargain' occurs when a defendant pleads guilty after
conferring with the defense attorney about the probability of achieving a particular sentence,
considering the judge's record and temperament. The defendant confesses and expects to
receive the sentence the judge usually imposes for that type of crime.").
19
See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF
NEGOTIATION 103-18 (1984) (discussing routine and adversarialjustice ). Unfortunately, most
of the leading academic field studies of plea bargaining were conducted twenty to forty years
ago. For examples ofthese studies, see generally JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS
OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS (1988); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is
THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN ALOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); MILTON HEUMANN,
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
(1978); and MAYNARD, supra. However, some key observations of the earlier research (e.g.,
the notion of a "going rate" for different offense types and a focus on case categorization
during "negotiations") also are consistent with the findings of more recent research in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., McCOY, supra note 18, at 130-32 (recognizing going rate of
punishment); Deirdre M. Bowen, An Analysis of Alternative Methods of Plea Bargaining 188
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with author)
(discussing norms and principles used to arrive at plea bargain); Stacey Thompson Hephner,
Negotiation: The Strength of the Courtroom Workgroup and the Guilty Plea Process 70
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Sam Houston State University) (on file with author)
(discussing use of"going rates for an offense" and effect on sentencing practices). While plea
bargaining has undoubtedly been affected by such developments as the widespread adoption
of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums in the 1980s and 1990s, the classic field
studies remain useful and well regarded repositories of insight. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561
(2003) (characterizing Heumann's study of plea bargaining in Connecticut in 1970s as "still
the best account of the practice").
20
See HEUMANN, supra note 19, at 35 (describing routine of some courts).
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and concurrence on "what to do" generally, but not
always, emerges. 21
As Malcolm Feeley memorably put it, plea bargaining in this mode
resembles less a Middle Eastern bazaar than shopping in a
supermarket:
Arriving at an exchange in this context is not an explicit
negotiation and bargaining process .... To the extent
that there is any negotiation at all, it is debate over the
nature of the case, and hinges largely on establishing
the relevant "facts" which flow from various
interpretations ofthe police report, and only occasionally
involve independent investigation by a defense. In a
supermarket customers may complain about prices, but
rarely "bargain" to get them reduced. 22
This mode of plea bargaining is most closely associated with highvolume, low-stakes cases like misdemeanors and low-grade felonies,
as well as cases in which the prosecutor and defense lawyer have a
good relationship and a long history of past dealings. 23
Many defendants welcome the impersonal, rapid-fire nature of
the routine case processing mode, preferring just to "get it over
with" in cases that are unlikely to result in substantial sentences of
incarceration. 24 From a procedural justice standpoint, though, the
concern is that not all defendants are content with letting the police
report do the talking for them.
Even if the report is entirely accurate, the defendant may have
a "story" to tell that would contextualize the information collected
by the police. And even if that context is irrelevant to the lawyers'
assessment ofthe case, it may nonetheless be subjectively important
to the defendant to tell his or her side of the story. Yet, in the
routine case processing mode, the defendant may have no
opportunity to do so until after the prosecutor has decided what the
21

Id. at 35 (footnotes omitted).
FEELEY, supra note 19, at 187-88.
23
See Brown & Bunnell, supra note 8, at 1065-66 (discussing conditions permitting quick
and efficient plea negotiations in federal cases).
24
FEELEY, supra note 19, at 30-31.
22
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plea offer will be (if even then). Given the realities of criminal
defense-notoriously overburdened public defenders, as well as
private defense lawyers whose practice economics also demand
speedy case processing-the defendant's lawyer will rarely spend
much time with the defendant before an agreement is reached with
the prosecutor. 25 At that point, the pressure will be on the
defendant simply to consent to the deal without troubling anyone
with new information. 26 In such a case, the defendant would be well
justified in concluding that he or she has no real voice in the
process.
The adversarial mode of plea bargaining raises different
concerns. In this mode, there is some obstacle to resolving the case
quickly by reference to shared understandings as to the "worth" of
various generic case types. 27 When this occurs, the prosecutor may
assume one or more of a variety of different postures. For instance,
the prosecutor may adopt a position of principled engagement,
substantively addressing the defendant's views of the case, either
accepting the defendant's basic framework for evaluating the case
or explaining why that framework is not the appropriate one. 28 Or

25
See, e.g., STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 124 (2005) (describing public defenders' reliance on police reports in
evaluating cases); Backus & Marcus, supra note 17, at 1033, 1053-57 (describing caseload
pressures on public defenders). For a classic treatment of the economic pressures that induce
private counsel to seek quick pleas, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182-83, 1198-1203 (1975). Court-appointed attorneys
may face similar pressures unless they are compensated on an hourly basis. See Alschuler,
supra, at 1262-63 ("The most satisfactory technique for compensating an appointed attorney
is probably to pay an established hourly rate."). "Twenty-five or 50 dollars may seem
seriously inadequate as compensation for defending a person at trial, but some lawyers view
it as a generous enough reward for conferring with a client for 10 minutes and then standing
with him in the courtroom to enter a plea of guilty." Id. at 1262.
26
See, e.g., BOGIRA, supra note 25, at 118 ("Some [public defenders in Chicago] said they
felt pressured to advise their clients to decide in five minutes whether to plead guilty or not.").
27
To note just a few potential obstacles, the case may be a manifestly unusual one with
no clear going rate, there may be a genuine factual disagreement as to what type of case it
is, or one of the negotiating parties may be a neophyte with unrealistic expectations.
28
For an example of principled engagement in one courthouse see Douglas Maynard's
study of plea bargaining in MAYNARD, supra note 19, at 108. The prosecutor in a DUI case
offered a reduced fine if the defendant pled guilty. Id. In arguing for an even more lenient
deal, the defendant's lawyer asserted that "[the defendant is] basically not a drinker, urn
might have a couple of beers once in a while, but she's not really a-she doesn't really drink."
Id. In response, the prosecutor disputed the factual assertion that the defendant was not a
"drinker," but implicitly accepted the premise that the defendant's alcohol consumption habits
were relevant to disposition of the case. See id. (saying "somebody who's not a drinker doesn't
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the prosecutor may assume a posture of unprincipled acquiescence,
that is, simple "horse trading," for instance, if a prosecutor responds
to a defendant's argument for lenience by offering a sentence
recommendation exactly half-way between the original offer and the
counter-offer. Alternatively, the prosecutor may respond to
resistance by withdrawal from negotiations or by threatening to
penalize the defendant for his or her failure to take the proffered
deal. 29
From a procedural justice standpoint, the chief concern in the
adversarial setting is not so much one of voice, 30 but rather that,
outside the principled engagement scenario, the prosecutor
effectively is saying that the defendant's view of the case does not
matter; the defendant's perspective is not only wrong, it is not even
worthy of substantive response. Although the defendant nominally
has a voice opportunity, that opportunity may seem something of a
sham.
It is important to recognize that in the end, regardless of the
prosecutor's stance in any given case, there will almost certainly be
a guilty plea. 31 Prosecutors can act in a high-handed way because
few defendants can afford to go to trial. The costs of trial extend far
beyond the litigation expenses (from which low-income defendants
are generally insulated anyway). For those who cannot make bail,
the unpleasantness of pretrial detention may be a very effective
just go to a liquor store and buy uh pre-made uh cocktails. I think that she is a drinker.").
Alternatively, the prosecutor's response might be characterized as "engaged." The prosecutor
could have expressly rejected the defense lawyer's premise on principled grounds and said,
for instance, "I understand your contention that your client is not a drinker, but that is not
an element of the offense, and I believe that it is important to ensure there are substantial
penalties in all DUI cases in order to send a consistent deterrent message."
29
For instance, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978), which began as a
routine bad check case, the prosecutor threatened, and ultimately brought, habitual offender
charges against the defendant in retaliation for the defendant's refusal to accept the
prosecutor's initial plea offer.
30
I say this because there is not likely to be a real dispute unless the defendant is
offering a view of the case that is at odds with the prosecutor's. There may be voice issues,
though, if the dispute arises from the views of the defendant's lawyer, and not the defendant
himself or herself. For instance, such issues may arise if the lawyer is pushing a suppression
issue that is not of genuine concern to the client, while wholly disregarding the client's legally
dubious, but keenly felt, entrapment claim.
31
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 5.17.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5172004.
pdf(showing in fiscal year 2004, of 83,391 criminal defendants in federal district court, 72,152
pled guilty or nolo contendere).
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deterrent to trial. 32 For those who secure pretrial release, there will
be a desire to draw tedious, inconvenient, and sometimes
humiliating court appearances to an end.
Perhaps most
importantly, though, it is well recognized that judges routinely
impose substantial penalties at sentencing on those defendants with
the temerity to go to trial, sometimes doubling the punishment, or
worse. 33
Thus, many defendants will perceive no realistic
alternative to whatever the prosecutor offers.
In any event, we have now preliminarily identified two areas of
procedural justice concern: the defendant who is railroaded into
accepting a deal without first having a meaningful opportunity to
tell his or her side of the story, and the defendant who faces a high-

32

See DAVIDHEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYSANDNIGHTSOFA YOUNGD.A. 47 (1990)
(describing judge's use of pointed reminder of potential length of pretrial detention as means
of inducing defendants to accept plea offers); Bibas, supra note 5, at 2491-93 (noting that in
misdemeanor and lesser felony cases, many more defendants are held in pretrial custody than
are sentenced to incarceration after conviction).
33
It is difficult to quantify the "trial penalty" with precision because of the possibility
that the characteristics of cases going to trial differ in important ways from those of cases
being resolved by guilty plea. However, several studies that attempt like-to-like comparisons
do find quite substantial differences in the sentences imposed after jury trials relative to
those imposed after guilty pleas. For instance, in one study of sentences imposed for different
offense types in five states, researchers found "consistent support" for the hypothesis that jury
trial cases are associated with harsher average sentences than guilty plea cases, including
a finding of a 350% plea-trial differential in sentence length in heroin distribution cases in
one state. Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences
After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 959, 973, 975 (2005). In another empirical study of2,772 cases that resulted in prison
terms, researchers found that sentences following jury trials were 44.5 months longer than
those following guilty pleas, after controlling for offense type, criminal justice status at time
of arrest, prior record, attorney type, geographic location, pretrial status, age, race, and
gender. See Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining As Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 88-90 (Z005) (describing comparison of"similar cases");
see also Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Variations in Trial Penalties Among Serious
Violent Offenders, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 650, 652 (2006) (using Pennsylvania data, finding
that defendants convicted after jury trial were about 2. 7 times more likely to be incarcerated
than those convicted after guilty plea, and received sentences fifty-seven percent longer).
While most empirical studies have found a trial penalty, not all have, which may reflect
differences in jurisdictions and offense types studied, as well as different definitions of what
would constitute a trial penalty. For a recent summary ofthe empirical literature, see Ulmer
& Bradley, supra, at 632-33. In the federal system, the trial penalty has been formalized in
the sentencing guidelines, which provide a twenty-five to thirty-five percent "discount" for
defendants who plead guilty. Bibas, supra note 5, at 2489. Of course, as Candace McCoy has
observed, "The critical point is that almost everyone, including defendants, believe[s] that [the
trial penalty exists]." MCCOY, supra note 18, at 164. It is this belief that, whether or not
empirically verifiable, drives the perceived need to plead guilty. I d.
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handed prosecutor unwilling to address his or her view of the case
in a principled fashion. The next Part will explain in more rigorous
fashion why these scenarios should be avoided--even assuming that
they do not result in distributively unjust outcomes.

III. THE CASE FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
This Part makes the basic case for attending to procedural justice
in plea bargaining. I rely primarily on the empirical research and
theorizing of social psychologist Tom Tyler and his collaborators,
whose work on procedural justice over more than two decades has
proven immensely influential in the social sciences. 34 After a brief
introduction to Tyler's procedural justice model, I consider how it
might be translated into the plea bargaining context. Next, I
discuss difficulties with the pursuit of distributive justice in plea
bargaining. As we will see, the uncertainty surrounding distributive
justice in this setting increases the salience of procedural justice.
Finally, I consider an important collateral benefit of procedural
justice: enhanced transparency for system outsiders-victims and
the public at large.
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODEL

Tyler's model rests on three interrelated claims. First, a person's
perception of whether a decisionmaking process was fair does not
depend solely on the outcome, but also on various attributes of the
process used to reach the outcome. 35 Those attributes include: (1)

34
See, e.g., RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 87 (1996)
(characterizing Tyler's work as "important" and "persuasive[]"); Heuer, supra note 11, at 210
(stating Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind's group value theory represents "the most influential
answer to [the] question" of why opportunity for voice in decisionmaking increases
perceptions of procedural fairness and satisfaction); Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of
Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 575 (2000) ("The most extensive work in this area has
been done by social psychologist Tom Tyler."); Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and
Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
Sci. 171, 172 (2005) ("The second decade of procedural justice research centered on the
remarkably prolific solo and joint efforts of Tom Tyler and Allan Lind .... ").
35
See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATIONWITHTHEPOLICEANDCOURTS 196 (2002) ("[P]eople's main consideration when
evaluating the police and the courts is the treatment that they feel people receive from those
authorities."); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule ofLaw, 30
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whether the person had an opportunity to tell his or her side of the
story ("voice"); (2) whether the authorities were seen as unbiased,
honest, and principled ("neutrality"); (3) whether the authorities
were seen as benevolent and caring ("trustworthiness"); and (4)
whether the person was treated with dignity and respect. 36 The
perception of voice, neutrality, trustworthiness, and respect can
promote the acceptance of decisions that are otherwise believed to
be incorrect or substantively unfair. 37 Indeed, in many settings,
perceptions of process fairness exert greater influence over
acceptance of the result than do the outcomes themselves. 38 Second,
the extent to which decisionmaking processes are perceived as fair
helps shape beliefs regarding the legitimacy of the legal authorities
responsible for the decision. 39 And third, the perception that legal
authorities have legitimacy enhances the sense that the authorities
are entitled to be obeyed. 4° Fair procedures thus promote

CRIME &JUST. 283, 286 (2003) ("[I]ssues of process dominate public evaluations of the police,
the courts, and social regulatory activities.").
36
Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 355, 380 (2003).
37
Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOKOFJUSTICERESEARCH
IN LAw 65, 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
38
Id. at 71. Tyler sometimes uses different terms than those employed in this four-factor
framework. For instance, Tyler and Huo describe acceptance of decisions made by legal
authorities as a function of two variables: "procedural justice" and "motive-based trust."
TYLER & Huo, supra note 35, at 76. These two variables, however, are implicit in the four
factors noted in the text. "Motive-based trust" corresponds to trustworthiness. Compare id.
at 80 (measuring motive-based trust by reference to questions "Did the authority try to be fair
to you?" and "Did the authority consider your input in making decisions?"), with Tom R. Tyler,
The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment
Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 441 (1992) (defining perceived trustworthiness by reference
to whether authorities "want to treat [people with whom they are dealing] fairly" and
identifying consideration of arguments as important component of this judgment).
Meanwhile, Tyler and Huo's notion of procedural justice encompasses voice, neutrality, and
respect. See TYLER & Huo, supra note 35, at 80 (identifying questions used to assess
procedural justice in study). In other words, in some studies, Tyler treats trustworthiness
as a component of procedural justice, see, e.g., Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 36, at 380
(identifying trustworthiness as component of procedural justice), while in others he treats
procedural justice and trustworthiness as distinct concepts, see, e.g., TYLER & HUO, supra
note 35, at 76 (treating trustworthiness separately). Because both phenomena are found to
contribute to the legitimacy and acceptance effects that are of present concern, TYLER & Huo,
supra note 35, at 76, I group them together in this Article under the single heading of
"procedural justice" as a convenient shorthand.
39
Tyler, supra note 35, at 286.
40 Id.
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cooperation with the authorities and compliance with their
directives, as well as the development of a more general sense of
obligation to obey the law. 41
These three claims are backed, to a greater or lesser extent, by
three decades of social psychology research, encompassing both
laboratory and field studies. 42 The studies are too numerous to
summarize (or even cite) here, 43 but a brief description of two
especially relevant studies will illustrate the nature of the available
empirical support. In one, Jonathan Casper and his colleagues
interviewed 628 felony defendants in three cities. 44 They found that
procedural justice in the processing of the defendants' cases made
a significant contribution to outcome satisfaction. 45 They further
found a significant correlation between defendants' perceptions of
procedural justice and the amount of time they spent speaking with
their lawyers (which they associated with voice) and the
respectfulness of the treatment they received from police officers at
the time of arrest. 46 In a second criminal justice study, Raymond
Paternoster and his colleagues gathered information regarding 4 79
domestic violence arrestees. 47 They determined that "[w]hen police
acted in a procedurally fair manner when arresting assault
suspects, the rate of subsequent domestic violence was significantly
lower than when they did not."48 They measured procedural justice
by reference to such variables as whether officers "took the time" to
listen to the arrestee's side of the story and whether the arrestee
was handcuffed in front of the victim (which they related to
respectful treatment). 49

41

/d. at 297.
See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 70-71 (discussing research and studies).
43
See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 172 ("As of early 2005, the Psychlnfo database list[ed]
almost 700 articles with the phrase 'procedural justice' in the abstract (more than 40 per year
since 1995 and more than 70 per year in 2000-2003) .... "). As Robert MacCoun observes:
"Few if any socio-legal topics ... have received as much attention using as many different
research methods." /d. at 173. For a recent summary of the literature, see id. at 174-88.
44
Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487-88.
45
/d. at 494.
46
/d. at 498.
47
Paternoster et al., supra note 13, at 175-76.
48
/d. at 163.
49
/d. at 177-78. These studies, representative of much of the procedural justice
research, are admittedly not without their limitations. They are, for instance, correlational
studies that, despite sophisticated statistical analysis, leave uncertainty as to the key
42
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Despite the strong empirical evidence supporting Tyler's model,
there 1s less certainty as to the underlying psychological
mechanisms.
Tyler himself emphasizes two overlapping
mechanisms. First, because "people derive much of their social
identity from their standing as full-fledged members of their group
or society," fair procedures matter to the extent that they
communicate positive messages as to social standing. 50 Second,

questions of causation. See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 173-74 (discussing uncertainty about
causation that exists in field studies). Another difficulty with many studies lies in the
subjectivity and potential untrustworthiness of self-reported attitudes about procedural
justice. See Paul G. Chevigny, Fairness and Participation, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211, 1212
(1989) ("[S)ubjects who seem to prefer neutral procedures may be expressing political pieties
to which they think it would be best to appear to subscribe."). It is important to realize,
though, that procedural justice effects have been identified in a great number of studies
conducted with diverse methodologies. As Robert MacCoun observed in a recent review of the
literature, "[T)he sheer heterogeneity of tasks, domains, populations, designs, and analytic
methods provides remarkable convergence and triangulation." MacCoun, supra note 34,
at 173. He concluded that "most concerns about the external validity ofthe fair process effect
(and its antecedents and consequences) have long since been settled." Id.; see also id. at 181
("There is ample evidence that procedural fairness and legitimacy are correlated, and it is
almost surely the case that the correlation reflects causation in both directions."). Even
critics of Tyler have conceded that the evidence in support of key components of his model is
"persuasive." Chevigny, supra, at 1217.
Objections to the Tyler model center not on its descriptive accuracy, but rather on the
possibility that it may be manipulated by authorities to create a "false consciousness," i.e., a
sense of satisfaction with outcomes that are distributively unjust. See, e.g., MacCoun, supra
note 34, at 188 ("For many scholars, fair process effects are so robust that they raise the
specter of'false consciousness'-the Marxist notion that political and market institutions keep
the proletariat ignorant of capitalism's true nature."); Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and
Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 LAW &
Soc'¥ REV. 647,658 (1993) (reviewing TOMR. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)) ("I
am concerned that behind the thin veil of Tyler's self-proclaimed neutrality is an alliance
between the study of procedural justice and the project of legitimation itself, between the
study of why people obey and the effort to provide greater space for the exercise of legal
power."). The critique is an important one, yet, given the dynamic and uncertain nature of
what people "really" want by way of outcomes, difficult to assess. See MacCoun, supra
note 34, at 191 (noting that determining what citizens want from procedure "turns out to be
surprisingly tricky"). Tyler has acknowledged, but generally sidestepped, the problem. See,
e.g., Tyler, supra note 35, at 285 ("[T)he model does not address nonnative issues concerning
whether people ought to defer to legal authorities and generally obey the law .... If the social
structure is viewed as fundamentally unfair by particular people or groups, then their
willingness to comply might be regarded as 'false consciousness'-that is, as a willingness
that should be discouraged. These issues are not addressed here." (citations omitted)). For
present purposes, I simply will assume that the mandates of the criminal law and criminal
justice authorities generally ought to be respected and obeyed.
50
See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 76 ("When one is treated politely and with dignity
and when respect is shown for one's rights and opinions, feelings of positive standing are
enhanced. On the other hand, undignified, disrespectful, or impolite treatment by an
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there is a natural relationship between procedural fairness and
expectations of fair outcomes over the long run. If, in an initial
transaction with legal authorities, a person perceives the authorities
as procedurally fair, then that person is apt to form a judgment that
the authorities generally act in a fair manner-a judgment that
might be referred to as a "fairness heuristic."51 Even if the outcome
in the initial transaction was unfavorable, the expectation that fair
procedures will be used in the future lends reassurance that
subsequent transactions are likely to produce fair outcomes,
promoting a greater sense of security about "the long-term gains
from group membership,"52 and an enhanced willingness to "invest
one's resources and identity in an ordered society."53
B. APPLICATION OF THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODEL TO PLEA

BARGAINING

1. Negotiation Versus Adjudication.
At first blush, plea
bargaining may not seem a good fit with Tyler's model. Mter all,
much of the social psychology research focuses on unilateral
decisions of legal authorities, such as decisions by police officers to
make an arrest or formal court-based adjudications. 54 "Bargaining"
would seem a very different way of reaching a decision, one in which
the freedom of each party to veto any proposed agreement might
plausibly obviate the need for, say, symbolic affirmations of social
status-respect for individual autonomy would seem intrinsic to the
transaction. Indeed, influential early research on procedural justice
suggested that people in disputes place a high value on retaining
direct control over decisions, indicating that negotiated resolutions

authority carries the implications that one is not a full member of the group." (citations
omitted)).
51
!d. at 76-77. This concept is particularly associated with Tyler's frequent collaborator
E. Allan Lind. For a more extensive discussion by Lind of the fairness heuristic, see E. Allan
Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY
PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 185-88 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
52
Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 76.
53
Id. at 77.
54
SeeN ancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 764
(2004) ("Most of the research that has been done regarding procedural justice has focused on
people's interactions with third-party authorities in dispute resolution or decision making
processes (e.g., judges, arbitrators, managers, mediators).").
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would generally be preferred on process grounds to adjudication. 55
This view, however, proved inconsistent with subsequent empirical
work, 56 which instead has tended to emphasize voice and other
aspects of Tyler's procedural justice model over decision-control per
se. 57 Indeed, a growing body of work tends to find much the same
procedural justice dynamic at work in negotiation as in
adjudication. 58 Even in a relatively high decision-control scenario,
people still value respectful treatment and a meaningful opportunity
to tell their side of the story.
Moreover, it is easy to overstate the extent to which plea
bargaining really is bargaining. 59 As noted previously, the practice
often resembles shopping in a supermarket60-with one important
exception: the dissatisfied defendant is not free to move on to a
different store in search oflower prices. Even when plea bargaining
takes on a more adversarial character, there tends to be massive
power imbalances between prosecutors and defendants. In light of
such considerations as transaction costs and judicially imposed trial
penalties, few defendants are willing to go to trial. 61 Furthermore,
the proliferation of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum
sentences over the past quarter-century has given prosecutors even
greater leverage over defendants than they have traditionally
enjoyed; when prosecutoriallenience is the only reliable means to
avoid a draconian sentence, the prosecutor can effectively dictate
the terms of the "deal."62 Bargaining dynamics vary considerably

55

See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 74-75 (discussing theory ofThibaut and Walker
that "disputants define procedural justice in control terms").
56
Id. at 75.
57
Welsh, supra note 54, at 764.
5s Id.
59
See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2129 ("[T]he very term 'plea bargaining' is something of a
misnomer.").
60
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61
See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
62
Michael M. O'Hear, The Original!ntent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN.
L. REV. 749, 808 (2006). The Supreme Court softened the harshness of some sentencing
guidelines systems through its decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), both of which recognized the right of defendants
to jury fact-finding offactors that increase sentencing exposure. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 231
(holding that state sentencing scheme violated defendant's rights and that statutory
maximum must be based solely on facts reflected in jury verdict or admitted by defendant);
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 ("[T]he 'statutory maximum' ... is the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
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from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but, in many, Gerard Lynch's
characterization of plea bargaining would be apt: administrative
justice has replaced adversarial and the prosecutor now occupies the
primary role in adjudicating guilt and setting punishments. 63 In
plea bargaining, then, the prosecutor may be perceived by
defendants less as a negotiating partner and more as the key
decisionmaker.
In short, there are good reasons to suspect that the procedural
justice effects documented in so many other settings do, indeed,
apply to the decisions of prosecutors in making and responding to
plea offers.
2. Translating Procedural Justice Into Plea Bargaining Process
Norms. As indicated above, the Tyler model identifies four factors
as attributes of procedural justice:
voice, neutrality,
64
trustworthiness, and respect.
How might these factors be
translated into plea bargaining practice? Let us consider each in
turn.
Defendants have voice to the extent they perceive an opportunity
to tell their side of their story. Interestingly, some research
suggests that voice matters even if the opportunity to be heard does
not occur until after the relevant decision has been made. 65 Voice
effects are greater, however, if the opportunity to be heard is
provided earlier in the process. 66 Prosecutors should thus ensure
such an opportunity is available before presenting an offer to a
defendant.

defendant."). Mandatory minimums, however, are exempted from this rule. See Harris v.
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 565 (2002) ("[T]he facts guiding judicial discretion below the
statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."). Moreover, even after the federal guidelines were converted
from mandatory to advisory in Booker, federal judges continued to follow them with nearly
the same frequency as before. See Michael M. O'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity:
Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 645 (2006)
(describing Booker decision and noting that guidelines compliance and overall sentencing
severity have not dramatically changed since Booker was decided).
63
See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2124,2132 (noting defendant's options are limited because
of disparity in power so that defendant likely will take whatever prosecutor offers).
64
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
65
See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 192-93 (concluding fairness judgments are enhanced
even when there is no chance of influencing decision).
66
Id. at 192.
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One common method for prosecutors to learn the defendant's side
of the story is through police reports. Police, however, are not
always diligent about collecting the defendant's side of the story. 67
Moreover, defendants may not think much of their opportunity to be
heard by the police. Their "hearing," for instance, may have
occurred in an emotionally charged arrest context, or may have been
colored by coercive or deceptive police practices. Thus, a serious
commitment to voice cannot be satisfied ·through an uncritical
reliance on police reports. 68
Instead, before making a plea offer, the prosecutor should
affirmatively ascertain whether the defendant had a meaningful
opportunity to convey his or her side of the story, either through
appropriately sensitive police processes or through an attorney.
Thus, for instance, in cases in which police documentation does not
indicate meaningful voice opportunities, the prosecutor should dig
a little deeper, refraining from plea negotiations until after he or she
has discussed the matter with the officers involved or has provided
the defendant with a meaningful voice opportunity through
counsel. 69 And, to the extent that counsel is regarded as the
guarantor of defendant voice, plea negotiations should wait until
after the defendant and the lawyer have conferred for more than
just a few moments in a crowded holding pen or the back of a noisy

67

See Paternoster et al., supra note 13, at 177 (describing study that asked arrestees:
"Did the [police] officers take the time to listen to your side of the story?").
68
That said, even such an uncritical reliance might be a procedural justice improvement
in some jurisdictions. For instance, a recent field study of plea negotiations in one busy urban
court found that prosecutors made their initial judgment of the worth of each case based
solely on information contained on the outside of the case file, consisting primarily of the
charge, the defendant's criminal history, and the name of the defendant's attorney. See
Hephner, supra note 19, at 57 (describing study). Moreover, "[d]ue to the large volume of
cases the prosecutors viewed on a daily basis, this folder was often the only acquaintance a
prosecutor had with a defendant until the plea was agreed to or until a trial date was set."
I d.
69
Encouraging police to collect statements from defendants is not, of course, without risk
to defendants who have a tendency to incriminate themselves when given an opportunity.
See Anemona Hartcollis, Remain Silent? Some in Custody Spell It All Out, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2007, at A1 (describing colorful examples of incriminating information supplied by
defendants on standard disclosure forms). Indeed, savvier defendants, fearful of making an
inadvertent damaging admission, might distrust voice opportunities provided by the police.
In order to help defendants feel more comfortable with their voice opportunities, it may be
helpful to treat these opportunities as privileged communications, much as Federal Rule of
Evidence 410 offers protection for statements made during plea negotiations. See FED. R.
EVID. 410 (stating rule on inadmissibility of statements made during negotiations).
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courtroom, as is the norm for indigent defendants in some
jurisdictions. 70 In support of this view, one might recall Casper's
finding of a significant correlation between defendant perceptions
of procedural justice and the amount of time simply spent talking
with a lawyer. 71
Neutrality is associated with a decisionmaker who is unbiased,
honest, and principled. 72 Most prosecutors doubtlessly believe they
are neutral, but the trick is to reassure defendants of this. Tyler
identifies the use of objective criteria as an important means by
which a decisionmaker can establish his or her neutrality. 73
Decisions, moreover, should be explained so as to demonstrate that
a neutral process was followed. 74 In the plea bargaining context,
then, prosecutors might enhance procedural justice by adopting
objective criteria to guide their decisions 75 and explaining to
70
See Backus & Marcus, supra note 17, at 1033-34 ("[I]n Broward County, Florida, the
elected public defender felt compelled last year to forbid his attorneys from advising indigent
criminal defendants to plead guilty unless they have had 'meaningful contact' with their
clients in advance. . . . [He stated,] 'It's not fair to make life-altering decisions while
handcuffed to a chair with fifty people standing around.'").
71
See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 498 (finding that amount of time defendant spent
with his or her attorney is positively related to reports of procedural fairness). In addition
to time pressures, there is another difficulty with relying on counsel as a voice intermediary:
what to do in cases in which the defendant wishes to tell a story that is counterproductive to
his or her own best interests, at least as judged by defense counsel. Imagine, for instance,
that in a close "reasonable doubt" case, the defendant wants to admit that he committed the
crime but argue that the victim "had it coming." Assuming that the victim's conduct does not
give rise to a valid legal defense, the lawyer is in quandary: telling the defendant's story to
the prosecutor likely will not strengthen the defendant's position, and even if the admission
cannot later be used against the defendant in court, it may harm the defendant by
undermining the lawyer's efforts to depict him or her in a sympathetic light during plea
negotiations. From a procedural justice standpoint, the defendant's desire for voice perhaps
can be reasonably well satisfied by an opportunity simply to tell his or her story to a lawyer,
particularly if the lawyer then explains why it might be harmful to repeat the story to the
prosecutor and ultimately leaves the decision up to the defendant.
72
See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 36, at 380 (relating neutrality with lack of bias,
honesty, and principled decisionmaking).
73
Tyler, supra note 35, at 298.
74
See id. (stating openness and explanation tend to show evidence of neutrality).
75
Gary Lowenthal describes the adoption of such criteria by the Maricopa County
Attorney in Arizona: line prosecutors were required to seek a prison sentence "for every
defendant who displayed a gun or knife in the commission of a crime," and prohibited from
reducing residential burglaries from felonies to misdemeanors. GARY LOWENTHAL, DOWN AND
DIRTY JUSTICE: A CHILLING JOURNEY INTO THE DARK WORLD OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL
COURTS 39 (2003). A somewhat more nuanced set of criteria would be preferable. See infra
notes 164-78 and accompanying text. Indeed, the procedural justice concerns discussed here
would provide further support for the sort of prosecutorial guidelines that long have been of
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.defendants why they take the positions they do. Explanations ought
to be conveyed through defense counsel, but, recognizing that busy
counsel may not effectively convey the information, prosecutors also
should explain their reasoning in open court when the defendant is
physically present to offer his or her guilty plea. 76
People infer trustworthiness when they believe "that the
authorities with whom they are dealing are concerned about their
welfare and want to treat them fairly." 77 Perceived trustworthiness
is enhanced when the authorities demonstrate that they have
actually considered the information offered during voice
opportunities. 78 Thus, in the plea bargaining context, when
explaining his or her positions, the prosecutor should expressly
address any claims asserted by the defendant in support of more
lenient treatment, 79 that is, provide what was termed "principled
engagement" above. 80
Perceptions of respect are associated with simple politeness by
the authorities, as well as the acknowledgement of citizens' legal
interest to academics as a counterweight to sentencing guidelines. See Ronald F. Wright,
Sentencing Commissions As Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1010, 1012 (2005) (discussing how academics "have looked optimistically to prosecutorial
guidelines as the next frontier for sentencing commissions to explore"). I provide a more
detailed proposal for the use of prosecutorial guidelines so as to enhance perceptions of
procedural justice in Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation
to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007)(manuscript at 9-13, on file with author),
available at http://pa pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1005373.
76
To be sure, explanations do not always make decisions more palatable, and may
sometimes have the reverse effect. An adverse decision that is poorly justified may leave a
worse impression than an entirely unexplained decision for which it may be possible to
imagine a good explanation. Consider, for instance, the defendant's response when a
prosecutor justifies a less-than-generous plea offer by reference to vague rumors that the
defendant belongs to a street gang-rumors that the defendant knows to be false and
malicious. In such a case, the defendant's respect for the system might actually be higher if
plea-bargaining remained within the proverbial black box. On the other hand, in the black
box scenario, defendants may be unlikely to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt and to
assume that some good explanation lies behind an adverse decision. Moreover, given a need
to provide a public justification for the plea offer, prosecutors presumably will tend to avoid
explanations that are facially implausible, readily demonstrated to rest on false premises, or
lacking a rational connection to the recognized purposes of the criminal justice system.
77
Tyler, supra note 38, at 441.
78
See id. ("Without considering their arguments, people believe that the authority cannot
be acting benevolently .... ").
79
See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 36, at 383 ("But people do need to feel that their
views have been actively considered. Authorities can facilitate such feelings by accounting
for their decisions in the respondent's own terms.").
80
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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rights. 81 In the plea bargaining context, prosecutors might
undertake a number of measures to enhance perceptions of respect.
They might, for instance, take care to use the appropriate honorific
when referring to the defendant (e.g., Mr. Smith, Ms. Jones) and
discourage unnecessary handcuffing and other forms of rough
treatment. 82 They also should avoid exploding offers that expire
before defendants have had a meaningful opportunity to confer with
counsel or to litigate colorable suppression motions as such offers
convey a disregard for the defendants' legal rights. Finally, after
formal charges have been filed, prosecutors should avoid threats of
enhanced charges in order to extract guilty pleas. 83 A guilty plea
represents the waiver of numerous constitutional rights, including
the right to a jury trial and the privilege against selfincrimination. 84 A prosecutor shows disrespect for these rights
when she threatens a recalcitrant defendant with charges that she
evidently did not think appropriate to pursue in the first instance. 85

81

See Tyler, supra note 38, at 440 (stating people respond to "whether they are treated
with respect, politeness, and dignity, and whether their rights as citizens are acknowledged").
82
Such basic forms of respectful treatment of criminal defendants are more routinely
observed in other Western nations. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
PuNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 8 (2003) (discussing
France and Germany's commitment to giving criminal offenders respect and dignity).
83
For a well-known example of a case in which a prosecutor did so, see Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978). In some jurisdictions, the use of such threats seems to be
common. See, e.g., MCCOY, supra note 18, at 180 (noting lawyers' observation that threats
of charging under California habitual offender law were "often used in plea bargaining to
elicit a quick guilty plea"). Indeed, charging threats have been effectively institutionalized
in some prosecutors' offices. For instance, in King County, Washington, the policy is to
charge conservatively at first: the prosecutor's office "only files charges on the offense that
it is quite confident it can win at trial, does not add additional charges just because the facts
may allow for it, and does not add enhancements." Bowen, supra note 19, at 78. If the
defendant does not plead guilty quickly, though, additional charges and enhancements are
filed in preparation for trial. Id. at 79. For instance, in drug dealing cases, school bus zone
sentence enhancements generally are sought only against defendants who choose not to
accept the prosecutor's take-it-or-leave-it plea proposal. Id. at 97.
84
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (stating guilty pleas involve waiver
of certain constitutional rights).
85
Robert Scott and William Stuntz have a wonderful analogy for Bordenkircher, the
leading charging threat case, that nicely captures this aspect of the prosecutor's actions:
The ... analogy is ... the lone gas station in the middle of the desert that
charges fifty dollars for a gallon of gas. Like the prosecutor in
Bordenkircher, the gas station usually gets its asking price, because the
difference between that price and the cost of going without (death in the
desert) is so high .... Imagine, however, that the gas station owner goes
further. Figuring that the buyer will kick and scream and haggle for an
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In sum, it is not hard to imagine a number of conceptually simple
protocols that could be implemented by prosecutors in order to
enhance defendants' perceptions of procedural justice: (1) before
starting plea negotiations, ensure that defendants have had a
meaningful opportunity to tell their side of the story, either through
police officers during pre-charge processing or through counsel after
charging; (2) develop objective criteria to guide plea negotiations; (3)
explain positions taken in negotiations; (4) expressly acknowledge
arguments for more lenient treatment; and (5) refrain from pressure
tactics like exploding offers and charging threats. These five
measures will be referred to here as the "procedural justice norms"
in plea bargaining. I leave for Part IV, below, a consideration of the
potential costs of these norms, which, as we will see, may have
important implications for the way that they are implemented. 86
Before moving on, one additional matter should be addressed:
whether defendants ought to be given a remedy for violations of the
procedural justice norms. Because there is little experience in this
country with enforceable rules of charging or plea bargaining, 87 it is
difficult to know to what extent enforceability would contribute to
prosecutorial compliance, on the one hand, or give rise to costly
disruptions in case processing, on the other. The answers, in fact,
may vary significantly by jurisdiction, depending, for instance, on
the culture and organization of each prosecutor's office. 88 In the end,
the enforceability issues require considerably more experimentation
and empirical analysis. 89 For present purposes, I will assume that

hour, but will eventually agree to the seller's price, the seller decides to
cut the negotiation short by letting the air out of the buyer's tires and
offering to refill the tires if, but only if, the buyer pays the seller's asking
price for gas.
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YAL:E:L.J. 1909,1964
(1992).
86
See infra notes 153-90 and accompanying text.
87
Perhaps the most notable example is New Jersey's "Brimage guidelines." See Ronald
F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1087, 1097 (2005) (noting how attorney general "reined in the available plea offers and
limited the factors considered during plea negotiations" in New Jersey).
88
For a general description of approaches to internal governance and policy enforcement
in prosecutor offices, see ROY B. FLEMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK
IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 56-59 (1992).
89
The difficulties are illustrated by the experience with the U.S. Department of Justice's
internal guidance documents for federal prosecutors. Lacking judicial enforcement
mechanisms, some of the Department's guidelines have been "repeatedly violated." See Ellen

432

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:407

procedural justice norms could be effectively implemented by most
prosecutors' offices through routine methods ofinternal training and
supervision, without a need to devise special enforcement
mechanisms. 90
3. Salience of Procedural Justice Effects to Criminal Law. While
theorists continue to debate the proper purposes of criminal
punishment, there can be little doubt that the contemporary
American criminal justice system embraces crime control as a
central, if not the central, objective. 91 With this overarching
objective in mind, this Part will consider how implementation of the
procedural justice norms may contribute to the effectiveness of the
criminal justice system. Before proceeding, though, it may be
helpful to distinguish more clearly between two levels at which
procedural justice is believed to operate. In Tyler's model,
procedural justice enhances both compliance with specific,
individualized directives oflegal authorities (for instance, the orders
included in a final judgment entered in a particular criminal case)
and compliance more generally with the legal system and its
requirements (for instance, the general requirement that citizens
obey the dictates of a jurisdiction's criminal code). 92
S. Podgor, Department ofJustice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice," 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PuB. POL'y 167, 176-85 (2004) (discussing reported violations of Petite Policy, grand
jury advisement policy, and guidelines on presentation of exculpatory evidence to grandjury).
Yet, even some critics of the Department's compliance history concede that the existing
guidelines structure "serve[s] important interests of educating new personnel in the office,
providing consistency within offices, and also providing a structure for important internal
policy decisions." Id. at 194. Thus, the development of" 'soft' remedies" may be preferred to
"strict judicial oversight and correction," which might lead the Department to get out of the
guidelines business altogether. !d. at 195.
9
° Cf Luna, supra note 34, at 603-05 (advocating adoption by police and prosecutors of
clear principles to guide exercise of law enforcement discretion, but without judicial
enforcement).
91
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000) (requiring that, at sentencing, federal judges
consider need for sentence imposed in order to, inter alia, "promote respect for the law,"
"afford adequate deterrence," and "protect the public from further crimes of the defendant");
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 1.05(6) (Consol. 2007) (establishing societal protection, rehabilitation, and
deterrence as purposes of penal sanctions); see also Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing
Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1190, 1206 (2005) ("Although [sentencing] guidelines are often viewed as deliberately,
and perhaps inherently, designed to emphasize retributive goals of proportionality and
uniformity, all state guideline reforms, even at their inception, have also given substantial
weight to crime control purposes.").
92
See Tyler, supra note 35, at 283-84 (arguing that process-based model of regulation
encourages general and specific legal compliance).
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The criminal justice system depends on voluntary compliance by
defendants at both levels. Consider first the level of individualized
directives. It may seem odd to suggest that there is something
important about voluntary defendant compliance with the
judgments reached in criminal cases. Mter all, the criminal justice
system has at its disposal the state's most powerful tools of coercion:
an army of police officers, all manner of sophisticated investigative
tools and techniques, laws threatening severe penalties for
noncompliance, and of course, a capacious network of unpleasant
jails and prisons. Yet, the system does require high levels of
compliance to reach its aspirations. We can see this need most
clearly in cases that result in a sentence of probation.
Probation plays an integral role in the criminal justice system; at
any given time many more defendants are on probation than in jail
or prison. 93 Probation is almost invariably conditioned on the
defendant doing certain things (e.g., undergoing treatment for
addiction, participating in other rehabilitative programming,
submitting to regular drug testing, or performing community
service) and not doing others (e.g., avoiding contact with other
convicts, avoiding contact with victims, or not engaging in further
criminal conduct). 94 These conditions generally are not arbitrary,
but are instead easily connected to important, express purposes of
the criminal justice system: crime prevention, rehabilitation, and
just punishment. 95 Yet, probation conditions frequently are
violated. 96 This gives rise to two important problems. First, to the
extent that violations go undetected or unsanctioned by
authorities-an occurrence believed to be quite common given the

93

See LAUREN E. GLAZE & SERI PALLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus04.pdf
(2005) (showing at end of 2004, more than four million offenders were on probation, while
number in jail or prison was just over two million).
94
See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (2000) (listing mandatory and discretionary conditions of federal
probation); HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 109-12 (3d
ed. 1987) (discussing standard conditions of probation).
95
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000) (listing purposes of punishment in federal cases);
ABADINSKY, supra note 94, at 130 ("In general, the courts can impose any conditions of
probation that are reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender ... or the protection
of the community .... ").
96
See GLAZE & PALLA, supra note 93, at 6 (indicating that only sixty percent of people
discharged from probation in 2004 successfully met conditions of their supervision).
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inadequacy of resources devoted to supervision97-the underlying
purposes of the conditions are defeated. Second, to the extent that
violations are detected and sanctioned, the processes for doing so
consume scarce criminal justice resources, especially when the
offender is sent to prison as a result of the violation. 98 Both
problems would be diminished by enhanced voluntary compliance
with probation conditions.
Even with respect to sentences of incarceration, compliance is a
matter of substantial concern, for reasons going well beyond the
potential for defendants to abscond. Prisons are not places of
unlimited coercion and control. 99 Violent disturbances remind us of
this in particularly dramatic form, 100 as do pervasive problems of
substance abuse among the incarcerated. 101 Prisons, particularly
outside the maximum security setting, provide varying, and not
insignificant, levels of autonomy. 102 This state of affairs seems
inevitable, not only as a result of resource constraints, 103 but also as
a result of the need to prepare most inmates eventually to reenter
free society. Indeed, the vocational training and other rehabilitative
programming available in many prisons would be of little value if
prisoners failed to accept their sentences, persistently resisted
prison authorities, and required constant, close supervision. 104 In
short, without significant measures of acceptance and voluntary

97

ABADINSKY, supra note 94, at 108.
See id. at 121-26 (describing typical probation revocation process).
99
See SPARKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 303 ("Prison staff are in fact frequently rather
keenly aware of the need to tailor their actions, demeanour, and demands in recognition of
prisoners' customary expectations-and their capacity to resist.").
100
See Anthony E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prisons, in
PRISONS 205, 226 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999) (collecting data on homicide
in prison).
101
See Chase Riveland, Prison Management Trends, 1975-2025, in PRISONS, supra
note 100, at 163, 187 ("Any candid prison administrator ... will admit that the effort to
control illegal substances ... is unending.").
102
See Bottoms, supra note 100, at 272 ("From one perspective, being a prisoner among
prisoners is a lifestyle that requires continual choices.").
103
See id. at 210 ("[(]]n most day-to-day situations) prisoners heavily outnumber prison
officers; and ... to many prisoners, the incentives or disincentives ... that the prison system
offers have little real meaning.").
104
See Gerald G. Gaes et al., Adult Correctional Treatment, in PRISONS, supra note 100,
at 361 (discussing wide range of treatment programs in use); Riveland, supra note 101, at 179
(noting importance of mental health treatment in prison and potential value of cognitive
therapy, anger management, and substance abuse treatment programs recently adopted in
many prisons).
98
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compliance, there seems little likelihood that prisons can accomplish
their objectives of maintaining a safe, orderly environment and
preparing prisoners for successful reentry to society. 105
Compliance also matters in the second, more general sense of an
internalized feeling of obligation to obey the law and cooperate with
legal authorities. Such an attitude plainly furthers crime-reduction
goals. To be sure, much of the political rhetoric surrounding crime
control in recent years has emphasized the coercive strategies of
deterrence and incapacitation, in lieu of the value-internalization
suggested by Tyler. 106 Yet, neither the public nor the legal system
has ever entirely abandoned hope in rehabilitation. 107 For instance,
parole, which is premised on rehabilitation, 108 continues to play a
central role in the criminal justice systems of many states. 109
Moreover, much evidence suggests a resurgence of interest in
rehabilitative approaches. 110 The widespread embrace of drug
treatment courts and victim-offender mediation programs across the
nation, for instance, evinces a desire for alternatives to the heavyhanded threats embodied in so much "get-tough" sentencing
legislation of the 1980s and 1990s. 111 In short, retribution and

105

Interestingly, precisely these sorts of concerns were an important motivating factor
behind the adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines in the 1980s; it was believed that
anger over unfair sentences contributed to prison violence and impaired rehabilitation.
O'Hear, supra note 62, at 763-64, 773.
106
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PuNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES
AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 91 (2001) (identifying incapacitation as initial purpose of
California's "three strikes" law adopted in 1994); O'Hear, supra note 62, at 787 (identifying
deterrence as chief purpose of federal sentencing reforms adopted in 2003).
107
See Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, in PRISONS,
supra note 100, at 479, 518 ("Recent research reveals that the public favors both punishing
and treating criminals ... .");see also id. at 518-22 (discussing several recent parole reform
initiatives that offer enhanced social services for parolees).
108
I d. at 482-83. Parole traditionally has provided job assistance, family counseling, and
chemical dependency programs, although such programs have tended to suffer from budget
cuts in recent years. Id. at 483.
109
Although the long-term trend has been towards discontinuing or restricting the
availability of parole release, most states retain parole in some form. See id. at 496 (providing
state-by-state data). Indeed, several states that "abolished" parole later reestablished it or
an equivalent. Id. at 482.
110
Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1233, 1252-54 (2005); see also Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing
Correctional Costs in an Era of Tightening Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED.
SENT'G REP. 332, 332-33 (2002) (discussing public opinion with respect to prevention,
rehabilitation, and sentencing).
m See Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 823-25
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deterrence in and of themselves do not provide anything close to a
complete account of American criminal justice today. Assuming that
it does advance crime control objectives, there is no reason to believe
that Tyler's legitimacy-based model is fundamentally incompatible
with the spirit and purpose of our criminal justice system.
Thus far, I have offered what the theorists would call a
consequentialist defense of procedural justice in plea bargaining.
However, there are those who reject consequentialism in favor of
deontological approaches to criminal justice. 112 While mounting a
full-blown deontological defense of procedural justice is beyond the
scope of this Article, I suggest a couple of reasons why even those in
the deontological camp might regard my proposed proceduraljustice
norms-if not my underlying reasoning-with sympathy. First, for
one who views the criminal justice system's overriding purpose as
the identification of, and imposition of just punishment on, the
morally culpable, there must be some appreciation of more robust
procedure from its accuracy-enhancing standpoint. For instance,
defendant voice may help to produce timely information that
prevents wrongful convictions or disproportionate punishments. 113
Indeed, the classic deontological critique of a deterrence-based
criminal law is that deterrence theory is said to be overly accepting
of punishments imposed on the factually innocent. 114 Second, even
to the extent that procedural justice fails to advance accuracy
interests, those favoring a deontological approach may nonetheless
be receptive to arguments for procedural reform that are themselves
grounded in theories of political morality. A full elaboration of this
approach will have to await another day, but one may indeed find
considerable support for at least some aspects of the proposed plea
bargaining norms in the Kantian tradition of political theorizing. 115

(2004) (discussing drug treatment courts); MarkS. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the
Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L.
REV. 251, 259-61 (2005) (discussing victim-offender mediation).
uz In criminal law scholarship, the deontological approach centers on the retributive view
that "punishment is justified solely because the person being punished deserves it." Russell
L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of"Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L.
REV. 843, 845 n.1 (2002).
ua See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
114
Christopher, supra note 112, at 848.
115
Jerry Mashaw's dignitary theory of process is perhaps the most influential and welldeveloped effort to ground procedural rights in the liberal tradition of political morality.

2008]

PLEA BARGAINING & PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

437

We should not, in short, regard procedural justice in plea bargaining
as a lost cause even on the deontological side of the great divide in
criminal law theory.
C. DOUBTS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

If the demands of distributive justice were reasonably
determinate, we might justifiably decide to prioritize these demands
over those of procedural justice.U6 Indeed, Tyler himself has
suggested that the fairness heuristic effect-that is, the tendency of
people to rely on procedural justice judgments in one transaction as
a cognitive shortcut to predict whether outcomes in future

Mashaw begins with a basic moral premise of individual autonomy: "Each citizen is an end
in himself, not merely a means for the attainment of collective ends. The government cannot,
therefore, pursue its purposes through processes which ignore the independent status and
purposes of the individual." JERRY L. MAsHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE 45 (1985). Arising from this premise, Mashaw identifies comprehensibility of
government action as a fundamental process value in a liberal democracy. Id. at 172-73.
Dovetailing with Tyler's procedural justice model, Mashaw's notion of comprehensibility
encompasses "reason giving'' (explanation) as an important obligation of government
decisionmakers. See id. at 176, 199 ("[R]eason giving confirms the participant, even in the
face of substantive disappointment, as engaging in an ongoing process of rational and selfregarding action."). Mashaw also notes the value of individual participation (voice) in the
decisionmaking process, albeit in a more qualified fashion. See id. at 178, 200 (discussing role
of participation in contributing to individual self-respect). For another effort to establish a
Kantian foundation for explanation and voice, see Edmund Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity,
and a Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII, at 172, 175-79 (J. Roland Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
Markus Dirk Dubber has suggested a similar argument specifically in the plea
bargaining context, identifying a deep tension between plea bargaining as commonly
practiced in the United States and the basic Enlightenment project oflegitimizing criminal
punishment through procedures that show respect for the defendant's moral autonomy. See
Dubber, supra note 5, at 591-92, 595-96 (discussing reformation of plea bargaining). He
notes with interest the arguments of some German scholars that more robust participation
by the defendant might render plea bargaining "consistent with the autonomy of the accused,"
and thus better legitimize the practice. Id. at 604-05.
For a more detailed argument that the ends of retributive and procedural justice may
be viewed in a complementary way, see O'Hear, supra note 75, manuscript at 6-8.
116
By "distributive justice," I refer generally to the justness of outcomes. See Casper et
al., supra note 12, at 486 (establishing perception of outcome justness as affecting defendants'
overall perception of courtroom experience). In the criminal law context, it is perhaps more
conventional (though hardly universal) to use the term "retributive justice" as a way of
describing preferred outcomes. However, because this term implies a particular theory of
punishment that may not be broadly accepted, I prefer a more open-ended term that is
intended to encompass whatever may be the preferred measure of the justness of outcomes.
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transactions will generally be fair 117-rests precisely on the
indeterminacy of distributive justice relative to procedural justice. 118
Consistent with this hypothesis, empirical research suggests that
procedural justice effects in criminal trials are considerably less
where the defendant's guilt or innocence is clear than where the
correct verdict is in doubt. 119 In light of such research, if we had a
high degree of confidence in the justice of plea-bargained outcomes,
then we might find procedural justice a matter of comparatively
little concern.
But how should we evaluate the outcomes? There would likely
be broad consensus as to at least one distributive principle: plea
bargaining should not result in the conviction of the factually
innocent. This one principle, though, supplies little meaningful
guidance in the great run of cases in which the factual elements of
the defendant's guilt of something are readily satisfied. Troubling
distributive justice questions pervade such cases. In expansive
criminal codes with many overlapping offenses, what is the correct
offense or offenses of conviction? What should be done in cases in
which the defendant, though factually guilty, might nonetheless
plausibly win acquittal as a result of the suppression of key evidence
or jury nullification? Should sentencing be addressed in the plea
agreement, and, if so, how? 120

117
See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 76-77; see also supra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
118
Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 80 ("Most people are ... much better at perceiving
whether they are being treated impolitely than they are at interpreting whether the fine they
received or the judgment handed down in their lawsuit is fair.").
119
Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is of No Consequence: Moral
Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 Soc. JUST. RES. 305, 315-16 (2001);
see also Heuer, supra note 11, at 221 (discussing studies indicating that disrespectful
treatment may be perceived as fair response to inappropriate behavior).
120
Viewing plea bargains as consensual transactions, one might argue that their
voluntariness per se satisfies the requirements of distributive justice. However, this
perspective disregards the interests of third parties such as victims, the community, the
defendant's family, and so forth, whose consent is not required to consummate a plea deal.
To be sure, the judge may attend to these interests in plea acceptance and sentencing
proceedings, but this is not the same thing as third-party consent and merely begs the
distributive justice questions of which third-party interests are legitimate and how each
should be weighed relative to others. Moreover, as many commentators have observed, in
light of pervasive disparities in bargaining power, information, and cognitive abilities, it is
far from clear that informed consent fairly characterizes the position of most defendants who
accept plea deals. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas,
and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. CoLO. L. REV. 863, 906-13 (2004)
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In recent literature, one common approach has been to use trial
outcomes as a benchmark. 121 As Ronald Wright has put it, "[a]
healthy system would aspire to replicate through its guilty pleas the
same pattern of outcomes that trials would have produced."122
While illuminating in some respects, the approach has important
limitations. 123 For instance, as criminal trials become increasingly
rare in many jurisdictions, it becomes more difficult to use predicted
trial outcomes as a benchmark. 124 Moreover, the trial distortion
approach says nothing about what may be the most important and
difficult distributive justice question in plea bargaining: how large
of a discount should the defendant receive from the expected trial
result in return for his or her guilty plea? Finally, the approach
accepts uncritically the mix of substantive criminal law, procedural
rules, and judge and juror proclivities that produce trial outcomes,
even though one of the potential benefits of plea bargaining is the
possibility of overcoming some of the features of formal doctrine and
legal processes that tend to produce unsatisfactory results. 125
Yet, theory seems to provide no more satisfactory a framework
than expected trial results. Basic purposes of punishment are a
contested matter and not infrequently point in different
directions. 126
Deontological (more specifically, retributive)
approaches are said to hold sway at present among academic

(discussing inequities in plea bargaining process).
121
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5, at 2468 ("Plea-bargaining practices need many reforms
to conform more closely to the shadows oftrial ....").
122
Wright, supra note 3, at 83.
123
For a more extended discussion of Professor Wright's "trial distortion" theory, see
generally Michael M. O'Hear, What's Good About Trials?: A Response to Trial Distortion and
the End oflnnocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (2007).
124
See Wright, supra note 3, at 83 n.12 (finding that lack of trials could lead to bargaining
abuses).
125
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL
LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 82 (2006) ("The claim that bargains do not
resemble the proper formal legal sanctions available is problematic from a desert perspective
only if the law on the books tracks desert better than the bargains do. Yet in an era of everexpanding criminal prohibitions and ever-escalating criminal penalties, there is reason to
suspect this is not the case.").
126
See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment,
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 250-52 (2004)
(discussing debates over deterrence as appropriate purpose of punishment and identifying
inconsistencies between deterrence- and culpabill.ty-based approaches in punishment of
environmental crimes).
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commentators, 127 but such consensus at a broad level of abstraction
(even if it really exists and is relevant) masks important areas of
dissensus as to what retributivism really requires of the criminal
justice system. 128
But perhaps there is yet hope that we can bridge the divide
between retributive and consequentialist approaches. As I have
argued elsewhere, Paul Robinson and his collaborators have
developed a promising means of doing so. 129 Indeed, because his
approach shares the same root concerns with perceived legitimacy
and law-abidingness that animate Tyler's work, Robinson's theory
merits some particular attention here.
Drawing on his own body of social scientific research, Robinson
argues that crime control ends are most effectively advanced
through policies that enhance public respect for the criminal justice
system and that this goal is best achieved by adhering to one
particular brand of retributive proportionality, that is, the
calibration of punishment with public views of the relative
blameworthiness of different types of criminal conduct. 130
Implementing his approach in a systematic way would require a
considerable amount of empirical research on public attitudes
towards different forms of criminality-research whose feasibility
has been called into question by some commentators. 131 According
to Robinson, however, existing research indicates that "[p]eople can
and do agree-not always, but usually, and more often than one

127
See Christopher, supra note 112, at 846-47 (noting that retributivism has been
endorsed by legislatures, courts, and scholars).
128
See, e.g., ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 125, at 19-20 (noting differences between
"desert pragmatists" and "desert moralists," and describing controversy over whether
resulting harm should affect punishment).
129
O'Hear, supra note 126, at 155-56.
130
RoBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 125, at 17; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,457 (1997). For an example of recent empirical work
lending support to Robinson's theory, see Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1399, 1402-03 (2005).
131
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRAL. REV. 1, 16 (1988) (noting that members of U.S. Sentencing
Commission rejected proposal to base sentencing guidelines on public views of desert because
they "believed that public polling was not sufficiently advanced or detailed to warrant its use
as accurate sources in ranking criminal behaviors").
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might think-about what constitutes deserved punishment in
specific cases. "132
Even granting this contention, however, there are important
limitations on the usefulness of Robinson's approach as a source of
distributive norms for plea bargaining. For instance, it is unclear
what should be done with crimes about which public values are
uncertain, evolving, deeply conflicted, or subject to considerable
regional variation, which might include such large and important
components of the criminal docket as drug and gun offenses. Nor is
it clear, as Robinson himself concedes, how to manage the implicit
trade-offs in plea bargaining between achieving desert in the case
at hand and showing lenience so as to secure a guilty plea and
conserve resources for doing justice in other cases. 133 There also are
conceptual difficulties in translating a ranking of relative crime
severity-which is where Robinson locates the public consensus on
which he relies 134-into a scale of actual punishment. We all may
agree that simple robbery should be punished less than armed
robbery and more than theft from person, but within those
parameters, what exactly should the prosecutor demand by way of
a sentence in any given robbery case? 135 Finally, what should be

132

ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 125, at 14.
See id. at 84 ("As yet, we have at best incomplete answers to these critical questions.").
134
See id. at 14 (stating that people assess relative blameworthiness by placing cases in
rank order).
135
Robinson would respond to this concern by arguing that additional criteria may be
developed to distinguish among those who have committed the same crime and that once the
full range of distinctions among all offenses are mapped on a scale anchored by the minimum
and maximum possible penalties, there will, in fact, be a discrete, narrow range of
punishment that will be associated with each degree ofblameworthiness of the defendant's
conduct. See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between
De ontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1835 (2007) ("[E]mpirical
desert does not produce an indeterminate range of punishment, as some have suggested, but
rather a specific amount."). This, however, suggests a scheme of enormous complexity,
reminiscent of the federal sentencing guidelines, which have been heavily criticized on
precisely these grounds. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 249 (2005) (illustrating problems with length and detail in U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines' attempts at uniformity). Moreover, even to the extent that consensus over
relative offense severity can be successfully translated into a usable, comprehensive, ordinal
scale, the consensus may break down over the appropriate anchoring points, which would be
a function of preferred overall severity. As Robinson has suggested, disagreements over
general punishment severity mask the ordinal consensus, Robinson, supra, at 1835, and raise
important conceptual and practical difficulties over how to account for community-tocommunity variation in preferred overall severity when evaluating plea deals.
133
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done in those cases in which public views of a just outcome diverge
sharply from those of the defendant, the victim, or both? Robinson
is deeply concerned with public views of the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system, but the public simply pays no attention to
the mine run of cases. Defendants and victims, however, do pay
attention to even the most routine of cases, so perhaps we ought to
weigh their views of distributive justice more heavily than those of
the inattentive public. 136
This suggests yet another approach to distributive justice: plea
bargains might be judged according to how well they satisfied the
expectations of the parties in the case. Empirical research indicates
that the fairness of outcomes tends to be assessed by reference to
expectations. 137 What might shape defendant expectations as to the
plea bargain? Unfortunately, there is no simple, clear answer to
this question. Repeat offenders surely will look to their own past
experience as a guide to what a just outcome would be in a new
case. 138 Additionally, empirical research indicates that defendants'
assessments of fairness are influenced by whether their outcomes
compare favorably with those of others convicted of the same
crime. 139 Expectations also may be shaped by conversations with
defense counsel, promises made by law enforcement officers, earlier
plea deals struck with codefendants, and so forth. In any given
case, the defendant may have no clear basis upon which to form an
expectation or may receive conflicting signals from a variety of
different sources. 140 Victims likewise may receive conflicting signals

136
See HEUMANN, supra note 19, at 169 ("I suspect that in most communities a 'zone of
indifference' surrounds court practices. Within this zone, the community is indifferent to how
and why cases are plea bargained or tried." (footnotes omitted)).
137
O'Hear, supra note 5, at 866; see also James H. McGinnis & Kenneth A. Carlson,
Offenders' Perceptions of Their Sentences, 5 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING, SERVICES &
REHABILITATION 27, 35 (1981) ("These data [gathered in prison inmate interviews] indicate
that offenders' perception of their sentences as lenient or severe is a function of the deviation
of the sentences from their expectations.").
138
Felony defendants typically do have prior involvement with the criminal justice
system. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 12, at 488 (noting that in sample of 411 felony
defendants only twelve percent had never been arrested before).
139
Id. at 486, 494.
140
In one study of one hundred inmates in an Ontario prison, researchers found that
forty-two based their sentence expectations on information received from their lawyers, while
fifty-five looked to their own personal knowledge of the criminal justice system. McGinnis
& Carlson, supra note 137, at 32-33. Underscoring the difficulty of using offender
expectations as a measure of distributive justice, the researchers found a remarkably high

2008]

PLEA BARGAINING & PROCEDURAL JUST! Cit;

,14;1

or no signal at all, and may develop expectations that divN'J.Ifl
significantly from those of defendants. Indeed, this litH· of'
distributive justice analysis may bring us back around to part of th•''
procedural justice agenda: if prosecutors develop and use objective'
criteria in a transparent way in their plea bargaining, this not only
should reassure participants in the criminal justice system that
prosecutors are neutral and trustworthy (proceduraljustice values),
but also should help condition participant expectations and better
ensure that outcomes match expectations (a distributive justice
value). In the absence of such criteria, however, an expectationsbased view of distributive justice would not supply an especially
clear means of assessing plea bargaining outcomes.
Although a comprehensive treatment of distributive justice in
plea bargaining lies beyond the scope of this Article, I hope that this
Part at least has conveyed some of the important difficulties. This
is not to say, however, that the quest for distributive justice is futile.
We may lack a single, determinate, consensus principle to guide the
analysis, but in any given case, there likely will be some outcomes
that seem reasonably consistent with a number of the different
approaches to distributive justice and other outcomes that seem
inappropriate from nearly any principled perspective. While it
generally may be defensible for prosecutors to surrender a solid
second-degree murder charge in return for a manslaughter plea, I
suspect it is only very rarely appropriate to make the same deal for
a plea to simple assault. Still, as is indicated by empirical
research, 141 there seems to be more than enough play in the
distributive justice joints for procedural justice to matter to criminal
litigation participants and thus to warrant greater attention from
scholars and practitioners of plea bargaining.
D. COLLATERAL BENEFITS: TRANSPARENCY TO THIRD PARTIES

Thus far this Article has focused on one set of procedural justice
benefits, that is, those arising from the enhanced acceptance of plea
bargaining outcomes and perceptions of legitimacy among

degree of variance in expected sentences, considerably higher than the variance of actual
sentences (standard deviation of 21.26 months versus 9.95 months). I d. at 32.
141
See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text.
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defendants. One set of collateral benefits, however, also merits
consideration: the procedural justice norms I have proposed will
increase the transparency of the plea bargaining process to
interested third parties, including victims and the community at
large. Although actual conversations between prosecutors and
defense counsel will remain private, the reasoning process
underlying plea deals will be more open to system outsiders; the
objective criteria prosecutors employ will be publicly available while
case-specific explanations of deals and acknowledgements of
defendants' arguments for lenience will be articulated in court
during plea acceptance hearings.
Although victims traditionally have been excluded from the plea
bargaining process, there is no reason to believe they would respond
to procedural justice in plea bargaining any differently than
defendants-that is, by exhibiting increased acceptance of outcomes,
enhanced perceptions of system legitimacy, and increased
lawfulness. While perhaps not conventionally conceptualized as
within the core objectives of the criminal justice system, these
effects seem not only clearly beneficial in their own right, but also
consistent with the system's growing attentiveness to victims'
needs. 142 Of course, offering victims meaningful voice opportunities
in plea bargaining gives rise to administrative challenges quite
distinct from those presented by defendant voice. 143 For that reason,
a full consideration of procedural justice for victims in plea
bargaining lies beyond the scope of this Article. For now, though, it
seems reasonably clear that victim-centered procedural norms
would dovetail in some important respects with the defendantcentered norms proposed here. More specifically, using objective

142

See Douglas E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims'
Rights Act: Judge Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassell in Degenhardt, 19 FED. SENT'G
REP. 36, 37 (2006) (describing recent legislative successes of victims' rights movement and
arguing that victims' participatory rights in criminal justice system are now well-established);
Michael M. O'Hear, Victims and Criminal Justice: What's Next?, 19 FED. SENT'G
REP. 83, 86--87 (2006) (noting proposal of victims' rights advocate to expand victim
participation in plea bargaining and arguing that victims' rights agenda represents implicit
rejection of narrowly focused deterrence and retribution agenda in favor of new "harmreduction" paradigm of criminal justice).
143
For a recent discussion of these problems, see generally Simon N. Verdun-Jones &
Adamira A Tijerina, Four Models of Victim Involvement During Plea Negotiations: Bridging
the Gap Between Legal Reforms and Current Legal Practice, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY &
CRIM. JUST. 471 (2004).
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criteria and providing explanations of plea deals would help assure
victims, just as much as defendants, of the neutrality and
trustworthiness of prosecutors. 144
Such transparency also might contribute to greater perceived
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Although problems with the
accuracy and proportionality of outcomes have dominated recent
scholarly literature on plea bargaining, 145 transparency and
accountability to the public have also figured prominently in the
discussion. 146 Public opinion surveys consistently find low approval
rates of plea bargaining. 147 Leading commentators have argued that
plea bargaining causes the public to lose confidence in the criminal
justice system, 148 and that public distrust of plea bargaining has
been manipulated by politicians to gain support for dubious criminal
justice reforms. 149 While it remains difficult to isolate the public's
principal objection to plea bargaining, there are good reasons to
believe that the secretiveness of the practice greatly contributes to
the negative perceptions. 150
Measures that enhance the
144

The limited empirical research on victims and plea bargaining does provide some
support for the hypothesis that greater transparency enhances victim satisfaction. See
McCOY, supra note 18, at 204 n.5 (reporting study showing "some increase ... in victim
satisfaction with the court process" when "allowed to be present at plea bargaining sessions").
For a more detailed discussion of victims and plea bargaining, see generally O'Hear, supra
note 75.
145
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
146
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 913-16 (2006) (identifying gulf between "insiders" and "outsiders" in
criminal justice system); Sergio Herzog, Plea Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public
Support?, 50 CRIME &DELINQUENCE 590, 590-92 (2004) (discussing public's negative attitude
with respect to plea bargaining); Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 33-34 (discussing public's
loss offaith in plea bargaining system). As suggested above, my view is that some scholars
may overemphasize the significance of the perceptions of a largely inattentive public relative
to those of defendants and victims. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. This is not
to say, however, that public perceptions ought to be regarded as wholly irrelevant to plea
bargaining reform.
147
See McCOY, supra note 18, at 64-65 (discussing two studies that "point toward
some general concerns underlying public dissatisfaction with the guilty plea process");
Herzog, supra note 146, at 590-91 (noting three studies in which large majority of
respondents (80%, 82%, and 64%) did not support plea bargaining).
148
See Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 33 ("The public in general, and victims in
particular, lose faith in a system where the primary goal is processing and the secondary goal
is justice.").
149
See McCOY, supra note 18, at 33-36 (discussing political context of plea bargaining).
150
See id. at 67 ("[T]he fact that the sentencing decisions are made behind closed doors
creates its own unfortunate impression."); Herzog, supra note 146, at 591 (noting arguments
that convertness and secretiveness of plea bargaining reduces public confidence).
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transparency of plea bargaining therefore may contribute to the
criminal justice system's perceived legitimacy/ 51 or, at the very
least, better inform misguided public debate over the practice. 152
IV. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS

Objections to the proposed procedural justice norms in plea
bargaining will likely fall into two categories: (1) implementing the
norms would have adverse effects on the operation of the criminal
justice system and (2) procedural justice in plea bargaining is not
capable of delivering the benefits suggested by the social psychology
model. These objections are detailed below along with responses to
each major concern. Although some of the objections do raise
important, unanswered questions as to implementation of the
procedural justice norms, they are not nearly so compelling on their
face to justify a definitive conclusion that the costs of procedural
justice in plea bargaining outweigh the benefits. 153
A. OBJECTIONS BASED ON ADVERSE EFFECTS

1. The Transaction Costs of Procedural Justice Will Undermine
Efforts to Achieve Distributively Just Outcomes. Incremental
procedure entails incremental transaction costs. Assuming criminal
justice budgets remain constant, the pursuit ofproceduraljustice in
plea bargaining may leave fewer resources available for other
purposes, thus potentially affecting the ability of the criminal justice
system to achieve distributively just outcomes (even taking into
account the modesty with which distributive justice claims should

151
Lending some modest support to this hypothesis, a recent study of Israeli attitudes
toward plea bargaining found that greater openness regarding the purposes of plea
bargaining was capable of increasing public support for the practice, albeit not by a large
margin. Herzog, supra note 146, at 606.
152
For a recent, more detailed account of the costs of opacity in the criminal justice
system, see Bibas, supra note 146, at 945-52.
153
I operate here in utilitarian, cost-benefit balancing mode. As suggested above,
however, it is possible to conceptualize procedural justice in plea bargaining as a moral
mandate. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. I leave a more complete elaboration
of this theory for another day, but note for now that there is at least a plausible basis for
implementing some elements of procedural justice in plea bargaining even in the absence of
a persuasive cost-benefit showing.
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be advanced). For instance, as resources of prosecutors aro
stretched, they may simply choose not to pursue as many cases or
may offer ever more generous plea bargains so as to further reduce
the number of resource-intensive trials. Alternatively, prosecutors
may shift resources to cases that are easy to prosecute (e.g., drug
and gun possession, routine street crime) and away from cases that
are more complex though perhaps no less important (e.g.,
sophisticated financial fraud, environmental crime, transnational
drug trafficking). Or prosecutors may attempt to enhance their plea
bargaining leverage by lobbying for legislative reforms that would
increase sentences or broaden the scope of criminal liability. 154
These, and any number of other conceivable prosecutorial responses,
threaten to skew patterns of charging, plea bargaining, and
sentencing in ways that may undercut the ability of the criminal
justice system to deliver criminal punishment in ways proportionate
to the severity of the offense, consistent across similar cases, and
otherwise responsive to public priorities.
Carried to an extreme-say, offering defendants and other
interested parties unlimited opportunities to speak in court and
requiring a written, point-by-point response to all factual and legal
contentions-procedural justice surely would conflict in substantial
and troubling ways with other important objectives. This does not
mean, however, that a more modest yet still meaningful procedural
justice agenda raises similar concerns. The following parts consider
in turn each of the proposed procedural justice norms.
a. Voice. Prosecutors should seek to ensure that defendants
have a meaningful opportunity to convey their side of the story
before making a plea offer .155 Implementing this proposal, however,
would not be without its difficulties. For instance, while defense
lawyers might seem the most appropriate vehicle for defendant
voice, case volumes and economic constraints often leave defense

154
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 537-38 (2001) (discussing lobbying efforts of prosecutors). To note that prosecutors
may seek legislation is not to say they will necessarily get it. As Darryl Brown has shown
through recent empirical research, "legislatures routinely decline proposals for new crimes
or greater punishments." Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, WASH. & LEE
LEGAL STUDIES PAPER No. 2006--07, at 4 (Sept. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
932667.
155
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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counsel with no more than a few minutes to interact with many of
their clients before court appearances 156-nowhere near enough time
to establish a relationship of trust with the client/ 57 obtain a
complete version of the client's side of the story, explore potential
defenses, and discuss plea bargaining objectives and tactics. In
some jurisdictions, then, public defense budgets may require
significant increases if lawyers are to provide meaningful voice
opportunities for their clients without substantially slowing down
the processing of cases.
As a lower-cost alternative, prosecutors might work with police
to develop processes to provide voice before formal charging. 158 One
possibility would be for police to offer all defendants an opportunity
to provide a post-arrest written statement that would be appended
to the official police report and included in the prosecutor's case
file. 159 An important difficulty is that so many defendants suffer
from impediments to effective written communication: low levels of
education, 160 poor cognitive functioning, 161 lack of fluency in
English, 162 and so forth. Paraprofessionals could be made available
to provide assistance, but this might significantly increase
transaction costs in high-volume jurisdictions. Alternatively,
prosecutors might screen written statements to identify those

156

See supra notes 25, 70 and accompanying text.
See BOGIRA, supra note 25, at 125-26 (noting distrust defendants tend to feel regarding
public defenders); LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 93 (noting gender, ethnicity, and other
barriers between public defender and client).
158
This is not to say that police necessarily will conform to unilateral prosecutorial
directives. Police and prosecutors have a complicated, interdependent relationship. See, e.g.,
Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 749, 758-94 (2003) (describing prosecutor-agent relationships in federal system).
Still, prosecutors typically do have some sway with police in light of their formal role as
gatekeepers to the courthouse, id. at 758-67, and, in any event, police should be as interested
as prosecutors in procedural justice reforms that are capable of increasing acceptance of
criminal punishment and decreasing recidivism rates.
159
Decisions would have to be made, and clearly communicated to defendants, as to
whether and how such statements could be used against them in legal proceedings. See supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
160
See Thomas C. O'Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation
After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 H.ARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 299, 309-10 (2006) (noting lack of education among prisoners).
161 Id.
162
See Christopher E. Smith, The Malleability of Constitutional Doctrine and Its Ironic
Impact on Prisoners' Rights, 11 B.D. PUB. fNT. L.J. 73, 89 (2001) (noting that many prisoners
often are not fluent in English).
157
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requiring additional follow-up by defense counsel in light of obvious
problems with written communication.
Experimentation and empirical research will doubtlessly suggest
additional voice alternatives. It is not clear what the most costeffective approach will prove to be. Indeed, the answer will probably
vary by jurisdiction, depending on such factors as the size and
composition of the criminal case docket, police-prosecutor relations,
and the structure and location of pretrial detention facilities. Yet,
there does seem to be some promising avenues for ensuring at least
minimal levels of voice without incurring overwhelming costs.
b. Objective Criteria, Explanation, and Principled
Engagement.
Prosecutors can reassure defendants of their
neutrality and trustworthiness by employing objective criteria in
making plea bargaining decisions, explaining their decisions, and
demonstrating consideration of defense arguments in favor of
lenience (even if such arguments are ultimately rejected). Such
measures would potentially give rise to at least three types of cost:
prosecutor time, outcome rigidity, and reduced deterrence.
Time costs need not be great. Objective criteria can be developed
on an office-wide basis. The rapidity with which plea bargains are
routinely struck in high-volume jurisdictions 163 suggests that
relatively few variables are regarded as significant in most cases, 164
and that those variables already are well understood by experienced
practitioners. 165 Reducing those variables and their weight to
written form as general plea bargaining guidelines should not be

163

See Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured ·
Ego of the Emphatic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1256 (2004) (noting
that public defenders often only meet clients and arrange guilty pleas).
164
This is consistent with psychological research on decisionmaking. SeeR. Barry Ruback
& Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and Policy
Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'y & L. 739, 756 (2001) ("Rather than being
complexly determined, most decisions can be explained by only two or three factors, because
oflimitations in how much information individuals can remember and process.").
165
See FEELEY, supra note 19, at 187-88 (comparing plea bargaining to supermarket in
which "customers may complain about prices, but rarely 'bargain' to get them reduced").
Lending support to this hypothesis of a clear going rate based on a small number of variables,
a recent study conducted in one urban courthouse found that the lawyers surveyed were able
to correctly predict the final outcome of most cases upon being told only the crime of
conviction, the defendant's criminal history, and the identity of the lawyers in the case.
Hephner, supra note 19, at 44-45, 55; see also HEUMANN, supra note 19, at 103 (describing
five factors that "weigh heavily" in classification of cases as serious or non-serious by
prosecutors).
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unduly burdensome. 166 Nor should it be especially time-consuming
to provide case-specific explanations based on those variables or
acknowledge defendants' arguments. 167
Rigidity concerns are more troubling. The use of objective
criteria inevitably will produce plea bargaining rules that are both
over- and under-inclusive, since no set of objective criteria can hope
to capture the full range of considerations that seem morally
relevant in all cases. Gary Lowenthal supplies a nice illustration
from his experience as a prosecutor in Maricopa County, Arizona,
where the County Attorney's "deadly weapon" policy required
prosecutors to seek a lengthy prison term in any case in which a gun
had been discharged:
In a case prosecuted by one of my colleagues . . . a
middle-aged man with steady employment, an intact
family and no prior criminal record had fired a gun over
the heads of his two teen-age sons to "get their
attention" when they were fighting in front of their
home. Although no one was hurt and the two sons were
horrified that their father was being prosecuted, the
most lenient plea bargain my colleague could offer
required the father to serve at least five years in prison.
This made no sense to me. The man had certainly
exercised poor judgment . . . but his conduct also
reflected an otherwise law-abiding parent's frustrated
response to an emotionally charged situation. Although
he may have committed the same crime as a gang leader
shooting a gun in the direction of members of a rival
gang, their punishments should not have been
determined in a one-size-fits-all fashion. 168

166
Indeed, it is not uncommon for prosecutorial offices to do so already, although often in
a less systematic, transparent fashion than would be ideal. See, e.g., HEILBRONER, supra
note 32, at 41 (noting policy of Manhattan prosecutor's office that sentences should increase
with each arrest); LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 39 (describing Maricopa County deadly
weapons policy).
167
Explanation and acknowledgment may be delivered to defense counsel and in open
court. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
168
LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 40.
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Lowenthal's example shows how the use of objective criteria-like
whether a gun was discharged--can produce outcomes that are
difficult to justify from any distributive justice standpoint. 169
Indeed, a rigid adherence to harsh, over-inclusive plea bargaining
rules seems hard to square with the procedural justice goal of
perceived trustworthiness, that is, the perception that the
authorities care about defendants' welfare and want to treat them
fairly. 170
The rigidity problem exposes a point of tension within procedural
justice theory that has not been adequately addressed in social
psychology literature. 171 However, this problem has been dealt with
extensively in the abundant scholarly literature on sentencing
guidelines. 172 The preferred approach in the sentencing context is
that objective criteria set presumptive sentences or sentencing
ranges, with some measure of equitable discretion preserved to
The
override presumptive outcomes in unusual cases. 173
presumptive approach seems readily adaptable to plea bargaining
guidelines and may provide a good model for addressing tensions
between neutrality and trustworthiness. 174

169

See also HEILBRONER, supra note 32, at 42 (describing one case in which application
of prosecutorial policy of seeking increased sentence for each arrest would have resulted in
two-month jail term for failing to pay one-dollar subway fare, prompting judge to give tonguelashing to prosecutor).
170
See Tyler, supra note 38, at 441 ("[P]eople value evidence that the authorities with
whom they are dealing are concerned about their welfare and want to treat them fairly.").
171
Mashaw has succinctly characterized the dilemma in connection with his "dignitary"
procedure value of rationality:
A concern for rationality ... leads to concerns about inconsistency and
arbitrariness. Yet the routines that make consistency possible in
bureaucracies are among our prime examples of irrational behavior-the
wooden inability to respond to differences in context. We thus seem to
confront a choice between the irrationality ofbureaucratic control and the
irrationality of official discretion.
MAsHAW, supra note 115, at 203.
172
See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1164-81 (2005)
(concluding that rigid numerical sentencing guidelines are too constraining); K.yron Huigens,
Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1068-79 (2005) (discussing advantages
of discretionary sentencing schemes over determinable sentencing schemes).
173
See Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law
at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1102-04 (2005) (discussing presumptive
sentences with potential departures from norm).
174
Ronald Wright, who also argues for prosecutorial guidelines structured in this way,
observes that New Jersey's guidelines already reflect this approach. Wright, supra note 87,
at 1103.
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The use of objective criteria in plea bargaining also may give rise
to concerns that deterrence will be compromised. Imagine, for
instance, that a prosecutor's office adopted a (not unreasonable)
policy of recommending straight probation in return for a guilty plea
in cases involving first-time possession of a personal-use quantity of
marijuana. An express policy to this effect might be interpreted as
a free pass for marijuana users and thereby undercut deterrence for
those who have not yet been convicted for the first time. On the
other hand, given the low risks of apprehension for many common
types of crime and the tendency towards over-optimism among
offenders, there are good reasons to doubt the strength of deterrence
effects even in the absence of such plea bargaining rules. 175
Moreover, repeat offenders, as well as those defendants who have
had family members and friends suffer prosecution, already are
likely to have a pretty good idea of what sorts of plea deals are
available for which types of defendants; they do not need written
rules to know where the safe harbors are. For other offenders,
particularly those with high social status, the risks of arrest and
conviction alone, regardless of sentence, will be an effective
deterrent. 176 Finally, to the extent that plea bargaining rules do, in
fact, diminish deterrence in some respects, there will be
countervailing deterrence benefits, as the rules (such as Maricopa
County's "deadly weapon policy") 177 will highlight those particularly
dangerous or undesirable forms of conduct that prosecutors most
wish to deter. 178

175

For a more detailed discussion of reasons to be skeptical of deterrence, see Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law
Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953-56 (2003).
176
See Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The
Unresolved Question of"Efficacy," 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 388 (2002) (noting social
status has effect on likelihood that arrest will have deterrent effect).
177
See LOWENTHAL, supra note 75 (describing policy).
178
To the extent one believes that criminal punishment in America is already too harsh,
one might fear another cost of transparency: once the public understands the magnitude of
the guilty plea discount given to some offenders, the public will demand even longer
sentences. As Stephanos Bibas recently observed, however, the harshness of public attitudes
likely to a considerable extent is caused by opacity, and transparency actually may help
alleviate the problem. Bibas, supra note 146, at 958. Moreover, as noted above, public
attitudes never have been as uniformly punitive as is sometimes believed, and now may be
shifting in a more constructive direction. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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c. Avoidance ofHigh-Pressure Tactics. Because it is conned.ed
to the perception that authorities take legal rights seriously, res pod.
seems incompatible with the use of high-pressure tactics by
prosecutors to extract quick guilty pleas, such as the use of threats
of increased charges or exploding offers that expire before
defendants have an opportunity to confer adequately with their
lawyers. 179 Prohibiting such practices, however, might make it at
least marginally more difficult for prosecutors to consummate quick
plea agreements, potentially leading to higher trial rates and
concomitant burdens on an overtaxed criminal justice system. 180
Elsewhere, I have explored at length the potential consequences
of a ban on charging threats. 181 In brief, while it is impossible to
predict the effects of regulating pressure tactics with precision, trial
rates likely would rise slightly, but probably not dramatically. The
rate of increase would be constrained by: (a) the manifest
advantages to most defendants of pleading guilty/ 82 and (b) the
potential for prosecutors to maintain their plea negotiation leverage
by increasing initial charges, lobbying the legislature for harsher
sentencing statutes and other self-serving new laws, or both. 183 To
be sure, these potential prosecutorial responses may be troubling
and costly in their own right. On the other hand, there also are apt
to be ancillary benefits, such as improved case screening by
prosecutors, before charges are filed. 184
Moreover, to whatever extent plea bargaining reforms do increase
trial rates, we should bear in mind that trials do not necessarily
represent a net loss. A trial may result in the acquittal of an
179

See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, psychology research has documented the potential for negotiations
to break down if one side is perceived to be acting unfairly. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1494 (1998) (citing
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 1281 (1993)) (indicating people are willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing for those who
act fairly and to punish those who act unfairly); see also O'Hear, supra note 5, at 866, 893
(applying these studies to plea bargaining). It is conceivable, then, that prosecutorial
pressure tactics sometimes misfire and that reducing the use of such tactics accordingly may
have little net effect on trial rates.
181
See id. at 891-901 (describing six possible options prosecutors might take in absence
of charging threats).
182
See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
183
See O'Hear, supra note 5, at 892 (describing possible responses to absence of charging
threats, including increasing initial charges).
184
See id. at 894 (noting early review of merits of case would be welcome development).
180
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innocent defendant who otherwise would have buckled under
prosecutorial pressure and pled guilty. A trial may provide an
opportunity for a jury, representing the voice of the community, to
signal disapproval of otherwise opaque prosecutorial charging
practices. A trial provides potentially valuable voice opportunities
for victims and defendants 185 and may result in useful sanctioning
of police misconduct, as by the suppression of evidence gathered in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. More generally, a trial offers
far more information than a plea hearing to interested parties and
the public about alleged criminal conduct, the human consequence
of crime, and the activities of police and prosecutors.
d. Complementarity of Procedural and Distributive Justice.
Although the costs do not seem unmanageable, some jurisdictions
will doubtlessly find it challenging to implement the procedural
justice norms. Slower case processing and the expectation of
increased effort by prosecutors, even if small on a per case basis,
may add up such that it becomes more difficult to achieve important
distributive justice goals, such as prosecuting and obtaining a
conviction in all cases involving serious social harm referred to
prosecutors by the police. To recognize the possibility of tradeoffs
between procedural and distributive justice, however, is not to
concede that procedural justice and the important benefits it offers
from the standpoint of acceptance, legitimacy, compliance,
transparency, and law-abidingness must give way. Moreover, it is
important to recognize that procedural and distributive justice,
while in tension in some respects, may in other respects actually
complement one another.
Consider, for instance, how voice may contribute to distributive
goals. Timely information from the defendant may prevent a
wrongful conviction or otherwise help the prosecutor reach a better
judgment about an appropriate resolution for the case. As Alafair
Burke recently has observed, psychology research indicates that
prosecutors are apt to develop anti-defendant cognitive biases once
a decision to charge is made. 186 Other commentators have observed
185

It is easy, however, to overestimate the voice qualities of real-world criminal trials.
See infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
186
See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1587, 1614 (2006) ("In the context ofprosecutorial
decision making, the biasing theory is the prosecutor's belief that the defendant is guilty.
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how prosecutors, given their position in the law enforcement system,
tend to develop strongly negative attitudes towards defendants as
a class. 187 Providing meaningful voice opportunities early in the
process may help the prosecutor to avoid biases, overcome
stereotypes, and better appreciate the strength of any legal and
factual defenses that are available, as well as any equitable
considerations that might appropriately influence resolution of the
case. 188 These positive effects of voice only would be strengthened
by the further requirements that prosecutors actually consider what
defendants say and then explain their decisions.
Other aspects of procedural justice also are capable of delivering
distributive justice benefits. Part III.c explained how the use of
objective criteria would advance the distributive goal of more
consistently satisfying defendant and victim expectations. 189
Meanwhile, the avoidance of high-pressure tactics may help
diminish the risk that innocent defendants will feel coerced into
pleading guilty. 190
In sum, it is far from clear that the proposed procedural justice
norms would result in an overall loss on the distributive justice side
of the ledger, let alone that the distributive justice costs would
outweigh the procedural justice benefits.
2. The Process Is the Punishment: Bringing Procedural Justice
to Plea Bargaining Undermines the Invisible Punishment on Which
the System Relies. The absence ofproceduraljustice marks criminal
defendants as devalued and undeserving of the community's full
regard. Yet it might be objected this is precisely as it should be: the
Once that belief is formed, confirmation bias causes her to seek information that confirms the
theory of guilt ....").
187
See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 111 ("Prosecutors are at the center of a culture
that abhors defendants and those around them. Every day, they interact with police officers
who see themselves to be at war with criminals .... Crime victims, another important
constituency, often have wrenching personal stories and cannot fathom why the courts allow
their tormenters to get off lightly. Exposed to these views, prosecutors often develop a black
and white view of the world.").
188
In addition to the value of the information produced by the defendant, any delays for
procedural justice purposes also may serve the cause of accuracy by giving more time for
useful information to become available from other sources. See McCOY, supra note 18, at 160
(noting common attorney view "that the chances of mistake in assessing case facts are greater
the younger the case").
189
See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
190
See O'Hear, supra note 5, at 899-900 (noting advantages to defendants spared from
charging threats).

456

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:407

whole point of punishment is to degrade the defendant, creating
deterrent effects, or, if you prefer the retributive viewpoint,
correcting the moral imbalance created by the defendant's
degradation of his victim. As Malcolm Feeley famously observed
nearly three decades ago, the process of criminal prosecution may
itself be viewed as part of the punishment-indeed, in many lowlevel cases, the process may be the only meaningful punishment
experienced by the offender. 191 Bringing greater procedural justice
to plea bargaining would give defendants something they do not
deserve, thereby diluting society's message of condemnation. 192
The argument is rather unattractive, at least insofar as it
condones "punishment" prior to a determination of guilt through
formal legal processes. Of course, most defendants who engage in
plea bargaining do end up pleading guilty, and most of those who
plead guilty likely are guilty. But no one claims the system is
foolproof. Indeed, as suggested earlier, an absence of procedural
justice in plea bargaining actually may enhance the risk of wrongful
191

See FEELEY, supra note 19, at 30-31 ("In essence, the process itself is the punishment.
The time, effort, money, and opportunities lost as a direct result of being caught up in the
system can quickly come to outweigh the penalty that issues from adjudication and
sentence.").
192
The argument addressed here is that, by diminishing the dignitary harms inflicted
during criminal case processing, enhanced procedural justice might inappropriately lessen the
process-based punishment received by some offenders. The converse, however, also might be
argued; that is, one might object that enhanced procedural justice inappropriately would
increase process-based punishment. This objection would focus particularly on a discrete
class of defendants: those who have been accused oflow-level crimes unlikely to result in a
sentence of incarceration but who nonetheless are unable to make bail. Their punishment
is, in effect, the amount of time they must wait in jail for resolution of their cases. To the
extent that procedural justice results in slower case-processing, these defendants will
experience a de facto increase in punishment unrelated to the actual severity oftheir crimes.
Even more troubling, as Josh Bowers has argued, an important subset of these
defendants-recidivists charged with petty crimes-includes those who are most likely to be
wrongly accused. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 8, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=983819 ("[R]ecidivists are overrepresented among innocent
defendants and probably comprise the majority ofthe population because institutional biases
select for their arrest, prosecution, and trial conviction."). It seems particularly unjustifiable
to increase the process-based punishment of those who are innocent but plead guilty anyway
to avoid an extended period of pretrial detention. These concerns supply another reason to
minimize the transaction costs of procedural justice, see supra Part IV.A.l, and may warrant
some relaxation of procedural justice norms for petty crimes. To the extent that procedural
justice nonetheless materially delays the consummation of deals in petty cases, defendants
who cannot make bail at least should be afforded an opportunity to enter an open guilty plea
as expeditiously as possible.
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conviction. 193 Thus, the assumption that most defendants are guilty
anyway hardly seems a satisfactory justification for unnecessarily
rough treatment before guilt is formally established.
Moreover, when the process itself is conceptualized as a sanction,
punishment acquires an ad hoc, opaque character. "Process
punishment" may be administered in diverse ways by a variety of
actors, not only the prosecutor during plea bargaining, but also (by
the same reasoning) the arresting police officer, jailers, the judge
who sets bail, and so forth. Who can keep track of all the rough
treatment that is dished out prior to conviction and sentencing and
ensure some degree of overall proportionality between the offense
and the punishment? Although it may be too much to expect that
the norms of procedural justice will be rigorously observed by all
actors throughout the criminal process, a due regard for
proportionality, accountability, and the rule oflaw counsels against
legitimizing rough treatment prior to conviction as a valid form of
"punishment." 194 Indeed, doing so would seem inconsistent with the
emphasis on transparency and uniformity that has dominated the
punishment policy agenda since the 1970s. 195
3. Procedural Justice May Result in Less Favorable Deals for
Defendants. It is a familiar complaint about procedural rights that
recognizing such rights may actually work to the substantive
detriment of those whom the rights are nominally supposed to
Similarly, we might hypothesize that enhanced
protect. 196
procedural justice in plea bargaining may result in less favorable
deals for defendants. After all, a reduction in procedural burdens
may be precisely what the prosecutor is bargaining for-the more
effort the prosecutor must invest in plea bargaining, the lower the
transaction costs avoided by entering into the deal. The prosecutor,

193

See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698, 2716-17
(2005) (book review) (discussing dangers of retributive punishment degenerating into
"animalistic" vengeance).
195
See Michael M. O'Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections on
the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 357, 366--69 (2004) (noting
importance of uniformity and transparency in sentencing guidelines).
196
See, e.g., MAsHAW, supra note 115, at 33-35 (discussing how welfare recipients may
have been harmed by enhanced constitutional due process rights surrounding termination
of benefits).
194
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presumably, will then demand greater concessions from the
defendant in the plea offer.
Framed this way, though, the argument misses the point of the
procedural justice effect: Outcomes are not the only things that
matter to defendants; fair treatment along the way may count just
as much or even more. The argument will have to be revised in one
of two ways. First, even taking into account the moderating effects
of procedural justice, defendants may still be left in an overall worse
position as a result ofless generous plea offers. Second, procedural
justice effects may be discounted entirely as a form of false
consciousness that induces defendants to accept otherwise
unacceptable outcomes. 197
Both lines of attack, however, depend on the dubious assumption
that, due to increased transaction costs, procedural justice reforms
will result in less favorable deals for defendants. As indicated
above, however, procedural justice in plea bargaining need not be
especially costly. 198 Moreover, what costs there are need not
necessarily undermine prosecutors' motives to deal; indeed, it seems
about as likely that prosecutors would become more generous. As
William Stuntz has observed, prosecutors are not like private
litigants seeking to maximize financial gain, but rather pursue a
much more complicated and uncertain set of objectives. 199 Many, for
instance, will be concerned primarily with volume of cases
processed. Given such a motive, higher per case transaction costs
should make prosecutors more, not less, averse to going to trial and
hence more willing to make plea bargaining concessions in order to
prevent a net reduction in case volume. Similarly, those motivated
by high conviction rates may also grow more trial-averse; 200 to the
extent that plea bargaining becomes more costly, prosecutors will
have fewer resources available for effective trial preparation and
may have a greater desire to avoid the heightened risks of failure

197

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158--67 and accompanying text.
199
Stuntz, supra note 19, at 2554.
200
See Bibas, supra note 5, at 24 71 ("[P]rosecutors want to ensure convictions. They may
further their careers by racking up good win-loss records, in which every plea bargain counts
as a win but trials risk being losses. The statistic of conviction, in other words, matters much
more than the sentence." (footnotes omitted)).
198
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presented by trial. 201 Other prosecutors will be motivated primarily
by a desire to achieve what they believe to be distributively just
outcomes in all of their cases; increased transaction costs may not
affect their plea bargaining positions at all. Indeed, as suggested
above, procedural justice may lead to more generous plea bargaining
by humanizing defendants in prosecutors' eyes and thereby
changing prosecutors' views of distributive justice in favorable
ways.2o2
In short, while individual results may vary, there are good
reasons to doubt that defendants' circumstances would be
systematically worsened by procedural justice.
B. OBJECTIONS

BASED ON DOUBTS ABOUT THE
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN PLEA BARGAINING

BENEFITS

OF

1. The Judge Provides the Procedural Justice. In a formal sense,
the prosecutor's plea bargaining offer, even if accepted, does not
conclusively resolve a criminal case. 203 Rather, the judge must still
perform two distinct functions: accept the plea and impose a
sentence. 204 In so doing, the judge will, to a greater or lesser extent,
formally adhere to basic norms ofproceduraljustice. 205 Defendants,

201

To be sure, prosecutors seeking to maintain case volume and conviction rates, in lieu
ofsweetening the plea bargaining pot, might lobby the legislature for harsher sentencing laws
or other reforms that would enhance their bargaining leverage. Such lobbying efforts might
or might not be successful. See Brown, supra note 154, at 3 (noting that most legislatures
decline to expand criminal laws). Even if successful, increased leverage might merely restore
the status quo ante without necessarily resulting in worse outcomes for defendants.
202
See supra note 188 and accompanying text. To be sure, some defendants will use voice
opportunities to advance non-credible assertions of innocence or to otherwise deny
responsibility in ways that reinforce, rather than undermine, the anti-defendant biases of
prosecutors. Assuming that such biases are pervasive and powerful, however, voice is
unlikely to do much harm and may do some good. Moreover, competent defense lawyers may
increase the likelihood of good outcomes by counseling their clients not to waste voice
opportunities on patently false denials of responsibility.
203
See generally Richard Neumeg, Annotation, What Constitutes "Rejection" of Plea
Agreement Under Rule ll(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Allowing
Withdrawal of Plea !{Court Rejects Agreement, 60 A.L.R. FED. 621 (1982) (discussing range
of potential scenarios following offer and acceptance).
204
See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)(3) (providing for judicial discretion in accepting plea
bargain); id. ll(b)(1)(M) (giving judicial discretion in sentencing).
205
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 ( 1971) (" [T]he adjudicative element
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant
what is reasonably due in the circumstances.").
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for instance, will be given an opportunity to speak in open court in
connection with both the plea and the sentence. 206 Various objective
criteria will govern acceptance of the plea and sometimes
determination of the sentence. 207 Credible arguments for lenience
will typically be addressed in the sentencing decision. 208 The judge
will expressly acknowledge the legal rights that the defendant
waives bypleadingguilty. 209 Finally, in many courtrooms, there are
deeply entrenched norms of decorum and courtesy. 210 Perhaps all of
this judicial procedural justice obviates the need for prosecutorial
procedural justice.
Although judicial practices may ameliorate perceptions of
unfairness, there are at least three reasons to doubt that they fully
address the problem. First, in many cases, the rituals surrounding
plea acceptance and sentencing lack real significance as
decisionmaking processes. Guilty pleas only very rarely are
rejected, 211 while sentences often are effectively dictated by the
terms of the plea agreement. 212 Procedural justice in these contexts
may thus appear an empty formality and serve only to highlight the
absence of procedural justice in reaching the plea deal. 213 Second,
while many judges display a strong commitment to procedural
justice, others treat the formalities surrounding plea acceptance and

206
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b)(1) (requiring in-person guilty plea acceptance); Green
v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (allowing defendant right to speak before
sentencing).
207
See, e.g., 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a)(4) (2000) (requiring court's consideration of sentencing
guidelines in determining sentence); FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b) (setting forth standards for guilty
plea acceptance).
208
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (requiring sentencing court to address matters
that are controverted).
209
See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b)(1) (requiring court to inform defendant of rights waived by
guilty plea).
210
See, e.g., United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 454-55 (1998) (holding that district
court judge's answer outside courtroom to prosecutor's hypothetical question regarding
sentence violated Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(1)).
211
See, e.g., BOGIRA, supra note 25, at 335 ("[l]n their haste to bag a plea, judges at 26th
Street sometimes accept a factual basis that's devoid offacts."); Turner, supra note 5, at 208
n.28 (noting 1985 study finding that judges reject two percent of guilty pleas).
212
See, e.g., King, supra note 5, at 295 (discussing how application offederal sentencing
guidelines can be manipulated through plea agreements).
213
See Dubber, supra note 5, at 552 (criticizing "hypocrisy that reduces the public plea
colloquy before the judge to a carefully rehearsed charade during which the participants
merely enact a script that was carefully crafted in the backroom of the prosecutor's office").
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sentencing with obvious disdain. 214 It is hard to imagine that such
judges are doing anything to inculcate positive perceptions of the
criminal litigation process.
Finally, to the extent that the procedural justice effect arises
from the development of a fairness heuristic, as Tyler and others
have argued, 215 procedural justice at the end of the process may be
too late. Heuristic theory predicts that earlier received information
should have a greater impact than later received information. 216 As
to fairness judgments specifically, laboratory research supports the
hypothesis that such judgments are indeed most influenced by what
happens earliest in the cognitive process. 217 Defendants are thus
apt to form their views about the fairness of the criminal justice
system based on their interactions with police and prosecutors, and
to assimilate their perceptions of judicial conduct to the earlier
formed heuristic. 218
2. Criminal Defendants Are Different. The social psychology
model is derived from a host of empirical studies testing the
attitudes and conduct of a great many people in a wide variety of
settings, 219 but perhaps the model cannot be generalized to criminal
defendants.
Mter all, defendants, as a class, have many
distinguishing demographic characteristics. 220 In contrast to

214

See, e.g., BOGIRA, supra note 25, at 39 (describing judge's habit of "rac[ing] through"
standard admonishments to ensure voluntariness of plea and describing one case in which
total of fifteen minutes was spent on accepting plea and determining sentence); Julian A.
Cook, III, Crumbs From the Master's Table: The Supreme Court, Pro Se Defendants and the
Federal Guilty Plea Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1895, 1900 (2006) (criticizing use of
leading and compound questions by judges in assessment of validity of guilty pleas).
215
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
216
Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 78.
217
See id. ("[F]airness heuristic theory predicts that the first-received fairness
information, whether it is procedural fairness information or distributive fairness
information, should have greater impact that [sic] later fairness information.").
218
This concern might be addressed through greater judicial involvement in crafting the
plea deal, as opposed to merely accepting an already negotiated resolution. Judicial
participation in plea bargaining has been the subject of considerable academic debate, Herzog,
supra note 146, at 593, and is prohibited or discouraged in most jurisdictions, Turner, supra
note 5, at 202. To the extent that judicial involvement has increased,judges should be careful
to attend to the procedural norms proposed in this Article.
219
See generally Tyler & Lind, supra note 37 (noting expansive research among variety
of groups).
220
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Criminal Offenders Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#inmates (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) (reporting
demographic statistics of inmates).
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members of the general population, defendants are considerably
more likely to be young and male, to belong to a racial minority
group, to suffer from addiction, to have low levels of educational
achievement, and so forth. 221 Do general principles of social
psychology apply to such a distinct social group? In particular, to
the extent that Tyler's model is premised on desires to maintain
social standing, 222 we may justifiably question whether the model
functions in the context of those who are already socially
marginalized. 223
The empirical research, however, indicates otherwise. Studies
have found evidence of consistent procedural justice effects across
categories of race, ethnicity, gender, income, and educational
attainment. 224 Moreover, procedural justice effects have been found
in numerous studies specifically involving criminal defendants,
arrestees, andprisoninmates. 225 Additional, albeit indirect, support
for these conclusions comes from the abundant empirical literature
on victim-offender mediation and other forms of"restorativejustice"
(R.J.). R.J., which contemplates responding to crime through
processes that offer voice and respectful treatment, 226 has been

221

See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 488 (noting young age, racial minority status, low
education levels, and high unemployment levels of felony defendants).
222
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
223
In a similar vein, one might speculate that the fairness heuristic strand of Tyler's
model, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text, might not work with defendants who,
because of their marginalization, are strongly predisposed to view the legal system as unfair
or who, because of mental illness, have unconventional patterns of cognitive functioning.
224
See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 73 (discussing research); MacCoun, supra note 34,
at 187 ("[M]ost studies have found striking similarities across demographic groups in the
antecedents and consequences of procedural fairness .... ").
225
See, e.g., TYLER & Huo, supra note 35, at 33 (noting that within sample studied, thirtytwo percent reported that their most recent contact with legal authorities was through being
stopped by police); Anne M. Heinz, Procedure Versus Consequences: Experimental Evidence
of Preferences for Procedural and Distributive Justice, in COURTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EMERGING ISSUES 13, 16 (Susette M. Talarico ed., 1985) (describing study of felony
defendants); Bottoms, supra note 100, at 254-56 (discussing studies of prison inmates);
Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487-88 (discussing study of felony defendants); Pauline
Houlden, Impact of Procedural Modifications on Evaluations of Plea Bargaining, 15 LAW &
Soc'yREV. 267,290 (1980) (discussing study of inmates); Jean M. Landis & Lynne Goodstein,
When Is Justice Fair? An Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 675, 675 (1987) (discussing study of inmates); Paternoster et al., supra
note 13, at 175-76 (discussing study of domestic violence arrestees); Tom R. Tyler, The Role
of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 51, 59 (1984) (discussing study of defendants in traffic and misdemeanor court).
226
See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 177 ("[P]rocedural justice theory has played an

2008]

PLEA BARGAINING & PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

463

found in numerous studies to produce higher levels of satisfaction
and lower levels of recidivism among offender-participants than
does the conventional criminal justice system. 227
Recent empirical research by social psychologist Larry Heuer
suggests why procedural justice might matter as much to members
of socially marginalized groups as to others. 228 Heuer's work
indicates that the relationship between respectful treatment and
perceived fairness is just as strong in transactions between
members of different social groups as it is in transactions between
members of the same social group. 229 Based on this research, Heuer
contends that:
[]]n encounters with out-group members, respect
continues to matter because people are also motivated to
believe that members of other groups value their groups.
For example, in an encounter between two strangers-a
young black male civilian and a middle-aged white police
officer in New York City-it is likely that neither
individual thinks of the other as a member of the same
highly-valued social group. Regardless, the civilian may
still be highly sensitive to whether the officer treats him
with respect because respect communicates an

important role in the restorative justice movement. Restorative justice draws on the notion
ofvoice and respect from procedural justice .... " (citations omitted)).
227
See Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the
Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 201 ("The data in this
review were consistently favorable to restorative justice when compared to adjudication. If
outcomes such as fairness, accountability, satisfaction, contrition and forgiveness, emotional
well-being, and feelings of safety are important, then restorative justice is the clear choice.");
see also Umbreit et al., supra note 111, at 284-89 (summarizing studies of recidivism rates
among restorative justice participants). Although the results of some of the R.J. studies may
be criticized because offenders self-selected themselves for participation, other studies have
employed random assignment procedures and still reported favorable results. See Poulson,
supra, at 169-70 (analyzing studies). It is notable, moreover, that R.J. participants, despite
their enhanced perceptions of fairness, do not necessarily report greater satisfaction with
outcomes, id. at 198, which lends support to the view they are responding to procedural
justice effects.
228
See Heuer, supra note 11, at 221-25 (discussing how group standing affects belief of
fairness).
229
/d. Some studies do, however, suggest that procedural justice effects are diminished
among so-called "separatists"-that is, those "relatively rare" people "with a strong minority
identification and a weak identification with American society .... " MacCoun, supra note 34,
at 188.
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important message about what the police officer thinks
of the standing of the civilian's social group. 230
In short, Heuer's analysis helps us to see that many of those who
are marginalized by what we might view as "mainstream" society
possess social identities that are important to them within other
groups; the perceived status of these other groups may be implicated
in their interactions with legal authorities.
3. Bargaining Is Just a Blip on the Radar Screen. For many
defendants, plea negotiations represent but a brief moment in a
lengthy involvement with the criminal justice system. Interactions
with the prosecutor are followed not only by interactions with the
judge, but also months, years, or even decades of incarceration,
supervised release, or both. During this time, defendants may feel
themselves in the power of corrections officers, probation officers,
pardon and parole boards, appellate tribunals, and so forth.
Treatment by such authorities over an extended period of time will
be perceived as fair or unfair and may ultimately overcome any
contrary impressions of the criminal justice system at the start of
the process. Perhaps, in short, we would do better to focus our
procedural justice efforts on prison officials and probation officers
rather than on prosecutors. 231
Although some defendants face a lengthy period of intensive
involvement with the criminal justice system, many others do not.
In misdemeanor and other low-level cases, the defendant is apt to
receive a sentence of straight probation or a relatively brief period
of closer supervision. In such cases, interactions with the prosecutor
will loom particularly large as a source of information for the
defendant about the fairness of the system as a whole. This
suggests that plea bargaining reforms might do well to focus on lowstakes cases; in more serious cases, procedural justice benefits may

230

Heuer, supra note 11, at 223.
Sumner Sydeman and his colleagues have offered a similar critique of Tyler's claim
that procedural justice in civil commitment hearings will enhance therapeutic outcomes. See
Sumner J. Sydeman et al., Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment: A Critique
of Tyler's Analysis, 3 PSCYHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 207, 215 (1997) ("The encounter of the
respondent with legal authorities is quite limited in commitment hearings ... , and as such
constitutes only a brief'blip' in the overall treatment experience.").
231
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be overcome or rendered superfluous by good or bad treatment in
pnson.
On the other hand, there may also be real significance to
procedural justice, even in serious cases. While acceptance of a
conviction and sentence may enhance compliance with prison rules
and the directives of corrections officers, 232 contrary attitudes at the
start of a prison term may lead to early disciplinary problems that
establish a pattern of harshly adversarial interactions with
corrections officers. Moreover, as noted in the previous section,
heuristic theory predicts that earlier received information
(procedural justice in plea bargaining) will have greater influence
than later received information (procedural justice in prison). Once
reached, fairness judgments, either positive or negative, may be
difficult to reverse. 233
4. The Empirical Studies Themselves Indicate a Surprising
Degree of Satisfaction with Plea Bargaining. Much empirical
research supports both the general hypothesis that procedural
justice influences perceived legitimacy and the acceptance of legal
rules and decisions, and the more specific hypothesis that
procedural justice effects carry over into the criminal litigation
context. 234 Unfortunately, there is much less empirical research
available on plea bargaining in particular. There is no obvious
reason, however, why the procedural justice dynamics would differ
fundamentally in this context in comparison with, for example, a
police officer's conduct during an arrest. 235 Thus, one might be
surprised to learn of one of the chief findings of some of the studies
that have been conducted on plea bargaining: pleading guilty is
associated with higher levels of perceived fairness among
defendants than is going to trial. 236 This finding poses a problem for
the thesis that legitimacy and acceptance may be enhanced by

232

See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text.
These timing considerations also underscore the need for police to attend to procedural
justice, since an arrest by police officers is typically the very first step in the criminal process.
234
See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
235
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
236
See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 499 ("[A] higher level of perceived procedural
fairness is not associated with the trial setting .... "); Landis & Goodstein, supra note 225,
at 702 (noting results "in line with Casper's finding that defendants who plea bargain are
more likely than those who go to trial to perceive their 'treatment' as fair"). But see Heinz,
supra note 225, at 26 (finding that felony defendants preferred trials).
233
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aligning plea bargaining practices with the procedural justice model.
After all, criminal trials are commonly viewed as the ne plus ultra
of due process. If plea bargaining is perceived as no less
procedurally fair than a trial, it might seem that either (a) plea
bargaining practices already provide ample proceduraljustice, or (b)
perceived fairness, at least in this context, is not significantly
influenced all that much by procedural justice.
This reasoning, however, is based on a faulty premise. A
criminal trial may be the ultimate of due process in the cramped
way that the term is understood in legal doctrine, but that does not
necessarily mean that a criminal trial actually embodies procedural
justice in a meaningful way. Consider voice, often viewed as the
core attribute of procedural justice. Alexandra N atapoff recently
has catalogued the ways that criminal procedure "silences"
defendants. 237 In cases that go to trial, nearly half of defendants are
dissuaded from testifying, largely because of the danger of pe:rjury
charges and sentence enhancements, and the possibility that
evidence of criminal history will be introduced for impeachment
purposes. 238 Moreover, given the general structure of criminal
liability, the testimony that is relevant and helpful to a defendant
will be quite narrowly circumscribed in many cases, often excluding
motive and mitigating circumstances that do not satisfy the
technical requirements for an affirmative defense. 239 Although
defendants may place a high value on being able to express their
views on such matters, they may be prevented from doing so on
relevance grounds or discouraged from doing so by defense counsel's
intent to develop a more legally advantageous, but less authentic,
"story."240 Lurking in the background of all this is the troubling
reality of indigent criminal defense. Overburdened defense counsel
simply may be incapable of ensuring that the defendant's
perspective is adequately conveyed at trial. Of course, poor legal
representation is a structural problem that infects not only trials,
but also guilty pleas. At the same time, given the idealized role of

237

Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L.
1449 (2005).
238
/d. at 1459-60.
239
See id. at 1469-70 ("[D]efendant motive, jury sympathy, and mitigating circumstances
that do not rise to the level of technical defenses are irrelevant.").
240
!d. at 14 70.
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trials in the popular imagination, it would not be surprising if there
were heightened expectations for meaningful voice at trial and if
counsel's failure to provide voice rankled more in the trial setting
than elsewhere. 241 In short, we ought not take much comfort in
findings that plea bargaining is perceived to be more procedurally
fair than going to trial; there are good reasons to suspect that trials
systematically fall far short of defendant expectations from a
procedural justice standpoint. 242
Additionally, we should note that the case disposition findings
emerge from studies conducted in particular times and places. Tlul
data was drawn from the 1970s and early 1980s, 243 before tho
explosion of get-tough sentencing laws that greatly enhanced
prosecutorial plea-bargainingleverage. 244 As the prosecutor's ability
to effectively dictate the terms of the plea deal has increased. it
would not be surprising to learn that defendant perception~"! of
procedural fairness have diminished. Moreover, the studies Uutf.
covered particular jurisdictions, 245 did not detail the plea bargu i 11 in l(
practices in those jurisdictions. 246 It may be that the prcvni.lllltJ
practices in those jurisdictions were relatively strong fmnt tl
procedural justice standpoint. If so, satisfaction with procedurn!il in
those jurisdictions would not necessarily indicate satiHlfl(~thHl
elsewhere.

241

See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence ofVoice on Satisfaction with Leaderu: lC:Vpb#'ii!J( t/iM
Meaning ofProcess Control, 48 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 72 (1985) ("[WIIHlll fii?(JJ)i{r (~~ijlt/Hil:
their opportunity to speak is a 'sham,' rather than an honest opport\wit:y W 1;\tltWlliW ilw
decision, they may react ... with anger.").
... ·
242
Landis and Goodstein relate their case disposition findings to delbntltltik f)i'~Jt4'i!!iJ!{;iJ
for resolving uncertainties as quickly as possible in the process; be(!nlllil(1tli!!H l.l!tf~!lilihtlf
resolves uncertainties more quickly than trial, defendants percoiv(• UH• miJ•.Ju\(ti'l~ · t;f
bargaining to be more fair. Landis & Goodstein, supra note 225, at 70:t 'l.'l!i• l!ftilt~J~(i!hi\}i
hypothesis, if correct, would lend greater support to the proposal lH'i'H f.IHll J}J'iltihi'l~hini
employ objective criteria in plea bargaining; such criteria would permit (l(ll\'il!l\flllli!lll!!!Hhof•
lawyers to develop a reliable sense of likely outcomes in many cast~s •M* li!)fn.n~ \J!H'j.(!f{lilfltl
begins.
·. · .
·
243
See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487-88 (drawing datu f'l·nnl .W'Hl<•l, Ltffl'HF<i tli
Goodstein, supra note 225, at 685 (drawing data from early 1980H).
244
O'Hear, supra note 5, at 888.
. .
.
245
See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487 (covering Baltimlll't•, [J!)ft,.•lt,. iFifl \'hu•,rrlKi•
Landis & Goodstein, supra note 225, at 685 (covering Illinois nnd l'vlh'!U'i!~JJlnL · .~ · .·.
246
Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487, Landis & Goodstein. ,Qu{lr'l! !lilf(i: '.tM. ;~J II~ I\
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V. CONCLUSION

In a system dominated by plea bargaining, criminal justice has
become more a matter of administrative than of judicial
adjudication. AE, Gerard Lynch has argued, this transformation is
neither intrinsically good nor bad. 247 Rather, the question is
whether, given a range of different ways of structuring
administrative adjudication, decisions are being made in a manner
that effectively advances the underlying goals of the criminal justice
system. Doing so undoubtedly requires accuracy in separating the
guilty from the innocent and in separating those deserving of heavy
punishment from those deserving of light punishment. Yet an
exclusive focus on the outcomes of plea bargaining misses the
important contributions that process potentially makes to the
acceptance of outcomes and ultimately makes to attitudes about the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Procedural justice in plea
bargaining thus warrants considerably more attention than it has
received from scholars and practitioners.
Drawing on a large body of procedural justice research, I have
proposed five process norms for plea bargaining: (1) defendant
voice, (2) use of objective criteria in making and responding to plea
offers, (3) explanation of plea bargaining positions, (4) consideration
of defendant arguments, and (5) avoidance of high-pressure tactics
that show disrespect for defendants' legal rights. The specifics of
how these norms are best implemented will vary by jurisdiction,
depending on such factors as case volume, resources available to law
enforcement and court personnel, offender demographics, and local
rules and customs of criminal procedure. In some jurisdictions,
robust procedural justice norms can be implemented with little or
no disruption of existing practices; in such locales, there seems no
good reason for prosecutors not to incorporate the norms into office
policies and practices. In other jurisdictions, particularly those
where the total amount of time that judges and lawyers spend on
most cases is better measured in minutes than hours, implementing

247
See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2145 ("An understanding of the different functions ofthe
administrative andjudicial aspects of our current system, moreover, should help us to identify
areas in need of change-and areas where change is not needed."). This position also seems
consistent with emerging scholarly consensus. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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procedural justice may be considerably more challenging. It is in
such settings that we are most likely to see real trade-offs between
procedural and distributive justice.
The prospect of such trade-offs doubtlessly explains much of the
traditional disregard for procedural justice in plea bargaining. I
have attempted to show, however, that the significance of these
trade-offs may be less than is commonly assumed. Procedural
justice can be meaningfully delivered through processes that are
well short of trial-type adjudication. Moreover, procedural justice
need not necessarily undercut, but may actually make important
contributions to, distributive justice. Additionally, given what
seems to be a substantial degree of indeterminacy in the content of
distributive justice, any claims as to distributive justice costs must
be advanced with some modesty. Finally, whatever the costs may
be, they should be assessed relative to the expected benefits of
increased acceptance and perceived legitimacy among
defendants-including greater cooperativeness with legal
authorities and reduced risks of recidivism-as well as the benefits
of enhanced transparency to system outsiders.
Certainly the assessment of many of the costs and benefits of
procedural justice in plea bargaining remains largely at the level of
hypothesis and requires considerably more real-world
experimentation and empirical research. There are compelling
reasons to believe, however, that thoughtful efforts to integrate
procedural justice norms into plea bargaining will not only help the
system do a better job of giving defendants the sort of fair treatment
that they want and deserve, but also will advance important public
interests in efficient and transparent crime control.

